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“RFP for GNSO Review” 
 
If the headline above has any meaning for you, you're 
probably not independent enough to bid for this RFP. For 
those of you who don't know why a GNSO Review is 
pending, what the GNSO actually is, or how the work 
product of this review will be used, and you're interested 
enough in ICANN to be reading this web log, you're the 
perfect person to submit a bid. Seriously. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1 The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) was 
established in September 1998 as a non-for-profit corporation under California State 
law. Its primary role is to manage all technical and policy functions relating to the 
Internet domain name system (DNS). As the number of networks on the Internet grew 
during the 1990s, so to did the need for a reliable process for managing the allocation 
of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and mapping these addresses to the corresponding 
hierarchies of domain names. It was also important to ensure a centralized and 
accessible record for the many IP standards and parameters, which frame and enable 
coherent information flow across the Internet. In 1995, the late Jon Postel, Internet 
networking pioneer, set up the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) in order 
to bring institutional structure to the stewardship of the DNS. Postel directed the 
IANA function during this rapid growth period until his unexpected death in October 
1998 – a month after the establishment of ICANN. Described by Ira Magaziner, 
Internet policy advisor to the White House at the time, as ‘the guy they trust’, Postel 
had been the integral force in the stable and successful growth of the DNS through the 
1990s. ICANN became in many ways the institutional embodiment of his legacy.  
 
1.2 ICANN took over responsibility for the DNS through a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) with the US Department of Commerce. Through a rolling 
three-year contract contained in the MOU, it operates and manages the IANA 
function. Figure 1 below gives a very basic overview of the organizational 
relationship between the technical Internet standards community and ICANN, 
showing how the IANA constitutes a vital link between the domain naming and  
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Figure 1: Overview of key organizations for technical and policy development 
for domain name system (DNS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: This diagram is designed to show the link between ICANN, the IANA, and the Internet 
technical standards development community. It is not an exhaustive mapping of Internet Governance 
organizations. We include the US Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) because of 
its development work for the first Internet-style systems in the late 1960s and its work in relation to the 
IANA. We include the W3C Consortium as it is a leading technical standards development body.  
 
 
technical standards communities. The main stakeholders in the technical community 
include the Internet Society, the Internet Architecture Board, and the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF). Through the IANA, the technical responsibilities of 
ICANN fall into two main strands of work as follows: 
 
[a] As the ‘core registrar’, ICANN is responsible for recording the IP 
standards and parameters developed by the technical community through the 
IETF and associated governance structures; 
 
[b] ICANN allocates and assigns Internet address space to five global 
Regional Internet Registries. These Registries in turn allocate Internet space to 
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network operators in different regions of the world. ICANN delegates 
operational responsibility for Top Level Domains through these structures 
down to country and local level. This function covers allocation of Internet 
space for country code Top Level Domains (such as dot.uk or dot.de) and 
generic Top Level Domains (such as dot.com or dot.org). 
 
1.3 The other major aspect of ICANN’s role is to develop policy for the operation of 
the DNS and IP address allocation. Figure 1 above shows the three Supporting 
Organizations within ICANN with policy development responsibilities. The Address 
Supporting Organization (ASO) works with the Regional Internet Registries and the 
IANA to develop policy recommendations for the ICANN Board covering issues 
relating to IP address allocation. The country code Name Supporting Organization 
(ccNSO) develops country code policies in cooperation with country Top Level 
Domain managers from national registries. The third Supporting Organization is the 
Generic Names Supporting Organization (GNSO), responsible for developing and 
recommending to the ICANN Board substantive policies relating to generic top-level 
domains (shaded pink in Figure 1).  
  
1.4 The GNSO is designed to ensure bottom-up and consensus-based policy 
development on gTLD issues. The structure consists of two constituent parts as shown 
in Figure 2. 
 
[a] Six Constituencies represent different groups of stakeholders with interest 
in gTLD policy development. Constituencies represent the interests of their 
members to the GNSO Council. Two Constituencies represent the domain 
name registration industry: 
- GTLD Registries (representing all GTLD Registries under contract to 
ICANN); 
- Registrars (representing all registrars accredited by and under contract 
to ICANN). 
Four Constituencies represent the interests of various groupings of Internet 
users and domain name holders as follows: 
- Commercial and Business Users (representing both large and small 
commercial entity users of the Internet); 
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- Non-commercial Users (representing the full range of non-commercial 
entity users of the Internet); 
- Intellectual Property Interests (representing the full range of trademark 
and other intellectual property interests relating to the DNS); 
- Internet Service and Connectivity Providers (representing all entities 
providing Internet service and connectivity users of the 
Internet). 
 
Figure 2: Overview of the ICANN structure with emphasis on the GNSO and its 
Constituencies 
 
NOTE: We have intentionally accentuated the GNSO in the chart. We are not able to portray detailed 
organizational structures of other parts of the ICANN structure.  
 
 
 
[b] The GNSO Council develops consensus policies based on the input from 
Constituencies and other sources. It consists of 21 voting members; three 
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built into its Bylaws that Constituency representative must come from 
different geographical regions. There are two non-voting liaisons to the 
Council, one appointed by the At Large Advisory Committee (ALAC) and the 
other by the Government Advisory Committee (GAC). The Council is 
responsible for managing the policy process of the GNSO as a whole The 
Council elects two members of the ICANN Board (Seats 13 and 14) by simple 
majority voting on nominated candidates put forward by Council members. 
The Chair of the Council is also elected by a majority vote of its members, for 
no longer than a term of one year, however the Chair may be re-elected after 
the year term is complete. All Council members fulfil their roles and 
responsibilities voluntarily and, apart from Nominating Committee members, 
do not receive funding from ICANN. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Terms of reference  
 
2.1 Since December 2002 ICANN Bylaws have stated that its Supporting 
Organizations should be subject to periodic and independent review if feasible no less 
frequently than every three years. The GNSO Council was subject to independent 
review in 2004 however this work did not include the GNSO Constituency structure. 
The ICANN Board agreed in July 2005 that the first full review of the GNSO should 
be commissioned, and in February 2006 chose after competitive tender a research 
team from the London School of Economics and Political Science to carry out the 
work. Our research has been conducted in a short period of time, during three and a 
half months leading up to ICANN’s June 2006 meeting in Marrakech, Morocco.  
Quote Box 1: On the structure of the GNSO 
 
‘The GNSO policy aim for ICANN is to funnel competing interests into a 
manageable format, create consensus, and pass that wisdom up to the Board’ 
 
‘The [GNSO] was designed as a bottom-up, consensus and grassroots 
process…that was what bound us together’ 
 
‘Mirroring the market in Constituencies is something conceived to prevent 
capture’ 
 
‘A well structured GNSO could serve a purpose…it cannot serve a purpose 
now’ 
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2.2 The Review addresses two core questions set out explicitly in the ICANN Bylaws 
(Article IV, Section 4). These questions are: 
- Whether the supporting organization [in this case the GNSO] has a 
continuing purpose in the ICANN structure; and  
- If so, whether any change in structure and operations is desirable to 
improve its effectiveness. 
The first question invites a radical approach to thinking about the role of the GNSO, 
its policy development, and how other structures and ways of working might improve 
the quality of policy outputs. We have received a wide range of views about the 
current and future purpose of the GNSO, from incremental ‘tinkering’ change to full-
blown dismantling, and we have attempted to convey the full range of opinion in our 
report. The second question is more concerned with thinking constructively about 
ways in which the GNSO process is failing or faltering, and ways in which it could be 
usefully reengineered to reflect the core values at stake, and shifting trends and issues 
in technology, civil society, and commercial markets. In some ways, therefore, the 
first of these two questions is set to default ‘yes’, as the option for starting the second 
question ‘if no,’ forces the respondent to consider a future without a GNSO. For those 
who had little or no awareness of the GNSO from the start, a future without the 
GNSO is much the same as a future with it. For those individuals who have invested 
hundreds of hours of their own time (or their organization’s time) into policy 
development work over the last 6 or so years, this approach may be different. Our 
approach from the outset has been to try to retain an open mind around these core 
questions, collect as many views from as wide a range of stakeholders as possible, and 
then put forward some practicable options for change that would address both 
questions.  
 
2.3 The Terms of Reference for this study can be traced back to initial discussions in 
July 2005, the ‘Luxembourg Resolution’ (it is common for ICANN policy documents 
and decisions to be known exclusively by location or date). They have been 
developed between the Board, ICANN staff, and the GNSO Council. The ‘Vancouver 
Resolution’ in December 2005 subsequently approved the Terms of Reference. There 
are four areas: 
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[a] Representation through the Constituency system. This aspects deals with 
the extent to which the GNSO as a whole and its six current Constituencies 
reflect and represent adequately global interests and views in the area of 
gTLDs. At an individual Constituency level, the key questions are whether 
Constituencies are doing a good job representing their members’ interests, 
whether their membership base could be broadened or deepened (or modified 
in some other way).  At the level of the whole Constituency system, the key 
question is whether this system is functioning effectively or whether changes 
could be made to make the system more inclusive, or to adjust to new policy 
issues. At the level of the GNSO as a whole, we also address the question of 
how systems of representation from the Constituencies, to the Council, to the 
Board are working coherently together. 
 
[b] Transparency and openness across the GNSO. This aspect deals with the 
extent to which policy development at Constituency level, and interests 
expressed during policy development by elected members, are open for 
scrutiny. It has been one of the enduring findings of this research that there is 
close relationship between the views people give you and their particular set of 
interests and affiliations within the ICANN community. Advocates of a 
particular position will invariably (although not always) hold relatively fixed 
views about opposing positions. And we have found that it is frequently 
(although again not always) possible to predict in advance broad lines of 
argument used by interviewees with only limited knowledge of their 
affiliations from the outset. We examine the process and communication that 
help to ensure openness, visibility, and organizational vitality.  
 
[c] How effective is the GNSO at developing policy positions? This aspect of 
the research examines the extent to which the policy development function 
operates effectively, embodied in particular the Policy Development Process 
(PDP). It examines the working arrangements of the GNSO and its Council in 
terms of how effectively constituency statements are put together and 
submitted, and how policy development work is carried out within the Council 
on Councillors’ time. We look also at the scope of policy work of the Council, 
and whether it gets involved in policy issues that are not within scope. We 
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examine the extent to which there is coherence and positive cooperation 
between staff and the Council. Also we examine to what extent the GNSO is 
able to incorporate external expertise and diversity of views from 
organizations from business, technical, and non-commercial sectors. Finally, 
we examine the quality of consensus positions generated by the GNSO and 
passed to the Board, and the extent to which voting systems and other 
mechanisms can impact on voting behaviour and policy output.  
 
[d] Implementation and compliance. The fourth key area addresses issues 
around implementation of gTLD policies, compliance with policies 
particularly by registration organizations, relationships between policy 
development and ICANN contract compliance and enforcement, and 
perceptions around whether the GNSO and its Constituencies play by a set of 
rules which are clear and understood. The study is not a review of quality of 
compliance across registration organizations, and we do not attempt to draw 
conclusions about substantive levels of compliance in the industry. We do 
however focus on the working relationships relevant to the GNSO that 
underpin compliance work, views on implementation and measurement of 
GNSO policies adopted by the Board, and general views and perceptions on 
who is playing by the rules and who is not.  
 
3. Context of the Review 
 
3.1 We review briefly below some key event and decision milestones in the 
development of ICANN, and how these relate broadly to the GNSO. Wider issues 
relating to ICANN are of course strictly out of the scope of this Review, and we have 
tried to make that clear to all our interviewees. Nevertheless, as one former senior 
ICANN staff member suggested to us as he wished us luck with the study, ‘it is both a 
low level and high level challenge’. Questions about the role and legitimacy of the 
GNSO appear to be necessarily wrapped in wider questions about the legitimacy of 
ICANN as a whole. A good proportion of ICANN Board time is spent interpreting 
and acting upon policy recommendations that have emanated from the GNSO. As a 
corollary to this, questions about the legitimacy of ICANN necessarily colour any 
thinking about questions on legitimacy and operation of the GNSO. Figure 3 sets out 
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some of these milestones with organizational changes depicted in blue and decisions 
or resolutions in red.  
 
Figure 3: A summary of key organizational changes and policy decisions relating 
to Generic Top Level Domains (organization change is indicated in blue, 
decisions in red) 
 
 
 
 
NOTES and ABBREVIATIONS: The table above is obviously not an exhaustive list of key dates and events. We have tried to 
outline some important ones, which give an overview of development both in organizational and decision-making terms.  
Abbreviations used are as follows: CA – California: GAC – Government Advisory Committee: TLD – Top Level Domain: IDN 
– Internationalised Domain Name: ALAC – At Large Advisory Committee: EVR – Evolution and Reform Process: ccNSO – 
Country Code Names Supporting Organization: sTLD – Sponsored Top Level Domain: PDP – Policy Development Process: 
DNSO – Domain Name Supporting Organization: UDRP – Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy; WHOIS – the 
name of the database holding contact details of domain name holders: WSIS – World Summit on the Information Society (UN 
and ITU conference) 
 
 
 
3.2 It is worthwhile rewinding slightly to sketch out some of main stakeholders 
involved in the creation of ICANN in the second half of the 1990s. A helpful point for 
departure is the decision in April 1995 by the National Science Foundation to 
decommission its backbone network NSFNET with a view to shifting the future 
development of the Internet into the private sector. NSFNET network had originally 
gone online in 1986, and by the beginning of the 1990s had become the first national 
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
ICANN events and decisions GNSO events and decisions
Mar WHOIS ‘data reminder’, ‘marketing restriction’ and 
‘restored names accuracy’ policies adopted by Board
Apr    Inter-registrar transfer policy adopted by Board
Oct     Expired domain deletion policy adopted by Board
Jun    US Government White Paper
Sept ICANN established under CA state law
Oct UDRP policy approved by ICANN
Nov First ICANN bylaws Nov DNSO established
Sept   IDN Committee established
Mar Evolution and Reform (EVR) committee
Oct ALAC and At Large structure agreed
Dec New bylaws from EVR Process
Jan   Nominating Committee established
Jun ccNSO established in ICANN bylaws
Oct ‘Sitefinder’ incident
Dec WSIS 1st phase Geneva         
May Early formation of the GAC 
Mar New sTLD applications received
Jul GAC revises its operating principles
Nov President’s advisory committee on IDNs
Nov   WSIS 2nd phase Tunis
Jan Revised dot.com settlement
May dot.xxx application rejected
Jan Separation of registry / registrar functions
Jul   Board agree to new generic TLDs
Oct   At Large online elections to the Board
Nov 7 new Top Level Domains selected
Jun   New PDP task force on purpose of WHOIS
Dec Final report on ‘new registry services’ PDP
New PDP on allocation of new generic TLDs
Feb New PDP on contractual conditions for registry services
Feb DNSO Names Council approves accuracy and bulk
access PDP Task Force
Dec GNSO established
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high-speed Internet network. In 1995 further privatization took place with the award 
of contracts for three network access points between commercial networks (in 1993 
NSF had awarded a 5-year agreement for registration of non-military domain names 
to Network Solutions Inc.). Some of our more experienced interviewees suggested 
that the institutional structures that had framed the development of networking 
technology to this point had involved complicated chains of collaborations and 
informal but effective working relationships. The decision therefore to privatize the 
backbone of the Internet at a time of rapid growth led to a period of uncertainty and 
consequent manoeuvring of interests. One interviewee involved at the time told us 
‘the authority chain was complicated…too complicated to be thrown out on to the 
sidewalk’. 
 
3.3 The period between 1995 and 1998 framed the process of finding some 
organizational response to the effective withdrawal of the NSF and the looming 
growth of the Internet. Major computing and telecommunications corporations such as 
AT&T, MCI, IBM, and Microsoft were all pinning their futures to Internet and 
networking markets. The prospect of fragmentation of the Internet or a struggle 
between competing commercial interests to run it, was too dangerous to contemplate. 
As more and more commercial traffic flowed across the Internet, major corporations 
prioritized the future stability of critical infrastructure. The entertainment content 
business, organizations such as Disney and the Motion Picture Association saw great 
importance in keeping the Internet intact, for reasons of being more easily able to 
control the use (and abuse) of content. Along with the educational and research 
community, other service providers such as the Commercial Internet Exchanges, and 
the US Administration, diverse groups developed strong interest in some kind of 
coordinating authority to ensure that the Internet did not break up on them.  
 
3.4 By the mid 1990s major intellectual property associations such as INTA were 
focusing on putting in place safeguards to ensure that the growth of the Internet would 
not pose a threat to trademark and copyright interests. On copyright issues, the 
priority was to establish some kind of universal and coordinated mechanism to disable 
any web presence that might infringe on the interests of organizations’ intellectual 
property. Similarly, on trademark issues, there was a need for a policy and a course of 
action for dealing with misuse of domain names, such as spurious registration of 
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domain names invoking or simply reproducing established trademarks. Towards the 
end of the decade, momentum along these lines increased, and it is here that the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) took on the role of the central 
coordinating body for developing and finalising policy on the Uniform Domain Name 
Dispute Resolution (UDRP). 
  
3.5 The UDRP provided a standardised and independent adjudication mechanism for 
owners of registered trademarks to challenge any new registration that impinged upon 
this intellectual property. This policy largely predated the formation of ICANN, 
however many of our interviewees either wholeheartedly or begrudgingly 
acknowledged that it has been and still is a good example of a successful policy 
development. Others have characterised the process as a move by the large intellectual 
property lobby to develop a watertight means of protecting big business. One 
interviewee put it, ‘UDRP is inconsistent with every trademark law in the world’. As 
Figure 3 shows, the approval of the UDRP was one of the earliest actions of the 
ICANN Board.  
  
3.6 The registration industry, characterised today in the generic space by Registries 
and Registrars, was largely unformed during the late 1990s. Indeed Network 
Solutions, Inc. (NSI) had retained and held a largely ‘unproblematic monopoly 
position’ since 1993 according to most of our more experienced commentators. In 
September 1995 the NSF authorised NSI to begin charging US$100 for registrations 
of second level domains under dot.com, dot.net, and dot.org. By 1998 this price had 
decreased to US$35 per registration largely through amendments to so-called 
‘intellectual infrastructure’ contributions, and remained so until the formation of 
ICANN. Network Solutions was also affected by the convergence and organization of 
intellectual property interests during the mid to latter years of the 1990s, and adjusted 
its policies accordingly, for example by reserving ‘the right to withdraw a domain 
name upon receipt of an order from a US court claiming such an infringement’. By 
the late 1990s however there was a general dissatisfaction across the registration 
community with the absence of competition in domain name registration.  
 
3.7 So, in these broad groupings of interest,  
- US-based computing industry; 
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- major entertainment and content providers; 
- organised intellectual property interests; 
- early registration stakeholders;  
- educational and research establishments; 
- US Government administration; 
one has the vital ingredients for not only the dynamic forces behind the formation of 
ICANN. Large commercial organizations, particularly the computing industry and 
content providers, could ensure that the DNS would remain stable and secure. 
Intellectual property interests had established a set of institutions and mechanisms that 
would ensure the sanctity and integrity of established trademarks and copyrights. 
Since the early 1990s the US Congress had been supporting research into networking 
technologies (with various Acts sponsored by Al Gore), and when the e-commerce 
agenda picked up pace in the second half of the decade, the Clinton Administration 
and senior advisors such as Ira Magaziner were integral to the work of creating an 
organization which would bring technical and operational stability, and root the 
administration of the DNS somewhere close to, but not within, the Federal 
government. As one commentator put it ‘the Democrats felt that they would get mud 
on their face from Republicans if they screwed up the Internet’ 
  
3.8 In June 1998 the US National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration issued a White Paper setting out a detailed plan for managing Internet 
names and addresses (see Figure 3). In particular it discussed plans to ‘privatise the 
management of Internet names and addresses in a manner that allows for the 
development of robust competition and facilitates global participation in Internet 
management’. It drew together the wide array of interests held by these stakeholders 
above. The International Forum for the White Paper (IFWP), the process convened to 
develop the White Paper, culminated in mid September 1998 with a draft proposal 
published by the IANA and NSI for the creation of ICANN. This was amended via 
working groups, and finalised at the end of September 1998. The first ICANN Bylaws 
were agreed with NTIA in November 1998. One interviewee who had been 
intensively involved in this process told us that ‘it was complicated…an issue unlike 
anything else I had ever dealt with’.  Another suggested that ‘it was a marvellously 
exciting time…all about factions and how factions could get hold of power’. 
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3.9 The Domain Name Supporting Organization (DNSO) was set up in November 
1998 as the body responsible for recommending policies on the DNS to the ICANN 
Board. It is no coincidence that stakeholders involved in creating ICANN had a large 
influence on how the original Domain Name Supporting Organization was structured. 
The reference to Constituencies being ‘self-organised’ in the Bylaws reflects a 
number of descriptions that we have had from more experienced interviewees who 
were involved in the formation of the Constituency system in the early days of the 
DNSO. One interviewee involved in setting up the original Constituency system 
suggested to us that: 
There was a six-month deadline to form the supporting organizations 
[…] The 50 people or so who showed up in Singapore in 1999 […] 
were put in a big room together and told to self-organize […] what 
fell out of that was the six Constituencies we have today. 
 
Some people also present suggested that this call to self-organise meant that the 
loudest and most aggressive voices tended to dominate proceedings and have a 
determining influence over the organizational structures that surfaced. One 
interviewee present at the formation of DNSO Constituencies suggested that these key 
groups were essentially asked by ICANN management to self-organise and ‘come 
back when they had sorted themselves out’. Further discussion with other 
interviewees confirms this perspective, to the extent that the outcome of this exercise 
in self-organization was largely determined by a rule of thumb that ‘whoever could 
shout the loudest got a constituency’. One commentator characterised the situation by 
saying that ‘if an Eskimo community had been agitating loudly enough…we probably 
would have given them seats’.  
 
Quote Box 2: On the emergence of the DNSO 
 
‘There was mad fighting about what should be the terms…real vitriol’ 
 
‘The Board said to the Chair of the DNSO…please resolve this by 6pm’ 
 
‘When you look at the way the DNSO was created, does it surprise you 
that it did not work out perfectly?’ 
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3.10 Some organizations such as the Council for European Top-Level Domain 
Registries (CENTR) at the time supported plans to establish more than the seven 
Constituencies (six listed above plus the original country code Constituency). Other 
interviewees with experience of this process have suggested that a much more diverse 
and fluid arrangement for interest groups could have been set up. As one pointed out, 
At an early meeting in Paris, a cross section of the ICANN 
participants suggested that any subsidiary structures within the 
DNSO should be established as fluid alliances […] that anyone 
be allowed to join (or leave) any given constituency just as they 
join or leave a political party […] Shortly after the Singapore 
meeting, ICANN rejected this advice and imposed an artificially 
compartmentalized structure’. 
 
3.11 The former Names Council displayed characteristic features of the current 
GNSO Council, in that elected members represented seven Constituencies, and had 
responsibility for developing consensus policy from the bottom upwards for all 
domain names issues. The seventh Constituency therefore was made up of elected 
members representing the interests of country code TLDs. It is perhaps strange in 
retrospect to view the vast diversity of national interests wrapped up in country codes 
as merely one Constituency with equal standing across six other Constituencies 
representing the interest of business, intellectual property and so on. As one 
interviewee put it, the DNSO at the time tended to reflect a ‘peculiar US computing 
industry perspective’ on the world, and the country codes were seen largely as a ‘sub 
topic under the Names Council…and far from mainstream work’.  
 
3.12 In January 2000 ICANN introduced the separation of the ‘wholesale’ registry 
function from the ‘retail’ registrar function, effectively splitting the registration 
activity in half and creating a market for registrars. Registrars were required to pay the 
gTLD Registry US$6 for each annual increment of an initial domain name registration 
and a further US$6 for each re-registration. Registrars were free to offer registration 
services to Internet Services Providers and direct to Internet users, and to set their 
price accordingly. This structural separation has given rise to an intensive and 
lucrative market for registrars, and as a result, casts ICANN in the de facto role of 
market regulator (even if not de jure). In March 2000 Verisign entered the picture by 
purchasing NSI for US$21 billion, and functioned as a combined registry and registrar 
(Verisign later sold its registrar business Network Solutions for US$100 million.) 
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3.13 One interesting attempt to find a way to involve individual Internet users 
worldwide in the ICANN process were the elections of so-called ‘At Large’ members 
to the ICANN Board in late 2000.  This ‘global political experiment’ allowed Internet 
users worldwide to register online and elect 5 (previously nine) Board Directors each 
for 2-year terms to represent the interests of Internet using population at large. The 
election was organised across five global regions, Asia-Pacific, Europe, North 
America, Latin America, and Africa. It is relatively widely accepted that these 
elections had serious flaws and were open to manipulation by national governmental 
interests. World citizens could vote as long as they had an email and a verifiable home 
address. It was found that some countries, notably Japan, succeeded in ‘stacking the 
vote’ effectively enough to get their own members elected. In our discussions with 
individuals who were around at the time, including representatives who stood as 
candidates in those elections, we found varying views on this period in ICANN’s 
institutional development. Some suggested that this was a period of real anticipation 
and excitement about what might be possible in terms of designing new global 
democratic structures of decision making. Many expressed more pessimistic views.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.14 This online experiment was abandoned, as well as At Large elections to the 
Board. Nevertheless, total votes cast for these elections were around 35,000 out of a 
potential membership population of 77,000. Manipulated or not, naïve and idealistic 
or not, there are signs here at least of organised participation outside of the context of 
the US. As one interviewee suggested, ‘despite the manipulation…the Japanese 
member of the Board actually turned out to be an outstanding representative’.  
 
Quote Box 3: On the Elections for At Large members of the Board 
 
‘The online elections were a complete farce’ 
 
‘It was open to all sorts of problems…and it was frankly insane’ 
 
‘They were all dilettantes…they made all sorts of mistakes…the biggest one 
was assuming that users would want to play a part’ 
 
‘There were issues about funding and the electorate…but these could have 
been solved 
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3.15 An important phase in the development of ICANN runs from late 2001 through 
to the late 2003, and is characterised by the Evolution and Reform Process and large-
scale organizational upheaval. This process saw the beginnings of the ICANN 
structure as it currently exists, as summarised above in Figure 2. In December 2002 
the Generic Names Supporting Organization (GNSO) was formed through the spliting 
of the DNSO into separate country code and generic top-level domain supporting 
organizations. As suggested above, the majority of our interviewees considered this 
separation generally a sensible move, in that it cleared space for more focused policy 
work in each area and reflected an institutional shift away from the ‘chronically US-
centric perspectives’ that had been central to forming ICANN originally. One 
interviewee suggested that this was an ‘important sign of growing organizational 
maturity’. We have had a range of views on the extent to which country code and 
generic domain name policies have much in common. Some people have said that 
separating the two was a mistake, particularly as there are major issues ahead which 
will require close interaction between generic and country code stakeholders (such as 
Internationalized Domain Names). Probably the consensus however is that country 
codes involve different issues, structures, and range of stakeholders, and that the 
‘separation and development’ strategy has been beneficial.  
  
3.16 This period also involved rethinking around the structures in place to encourage 
consensus on matters of policy. Policy development work to date had not been 
formalized in any kind of written process, particularly incorporation of Constituency 
views. The written response to the 2005 proposed settlement with Verisign by the 
gLTD Registry Constituency summarizes this as follows:  
 
By 2002, it was widely (but not universally) conceded that 
the standard for measuring consensus laid out in the 
Registry Agreements and the Registrar Accreditation 
Agreements was unworkable. The standard by which 
consensus was measured – the absence of substantial 
opposition – was a barrier to policy development. 
Accordingly, as part of the evolution and reform process, 
ICANN amended its bylaws to include the GNSO Policy 
Development Process. 
 
3.17 This period of organizational change gave rise to agreement on new At Large 
structures in October 2002, revisiting earlier attempts to providing channels for 
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representation for individuals and global civil society. This took the form of the At 
Large Advisory Committee (ALAC – see Figure 4) and its Regional Advisory Liaison 
Organizations (RALOs). As Figure 4 below suggests, the ALAC has spent much of its 
time since 2002 setting up new global representative structures, and providing a forum 
for individuals and their representative associations to discuss issues relating to 
domain name policies and decision-making. In recent years it has also received funds 
from ICANN to grow these outreach structures. The Nominating Committee (known 
as the Nom Com) was also established during this period in January 2003, and 
currently appoints three voting members of the GNSO Council, an innovation largely 
designed to imbue the Council with some independent and levelling influence that 
could be swayed by the arguments of different blocs depending on the issues at stake. 
One Nominating Committee Council member described their role as that of ‘a judge 
balancing arguments’. 
 
Figure 4: Main themes discussed on the At Large Advisory Committee mailing 
list, by year  
 
NOTE: The At Large Advisory Committee (ALAC) is not in the scope of this Review, however GNSO 
related issues are widely discussed and the ALAC has a designated liaison to the GNSO Council. 
 
 
3.18 The period since the beginning of 2004 has been characterised by increasing 
realignment with international interests on global Internet governance issues, 
management of legacy generic space issues largely connected to dot.com and dot.net 
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contracts with Verisign, questions about the role of ICANN and its relationship with 
the US government, and the increasing prominence of some complicated technical 
and policy issues, most notably Internationalised Domain Names (IDN). 
 
3.19 The first phase of the UN World Summit on the Internet Society began with a 
conference in Geneva in December 2003. A good mix of interviewees have suggested 
that the initiation of the WSIS process, and the subsequent establishment of the UN 
Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) has led ICANN to renew its 
emphasis on international cooperation on Internet governance issues. This was 
illustrated by the agreement in July 2004 that the Government Advisory Committee 
within ICANN should amend its operating principles and processes to strengthen its 
interaction with the ICANN Board and constituent parts of the ICANN organization, 
including the GNSO. The second phase of the WSIS began in November 2005 with a 
conference in Tunis. This marked an agreement between ICANN and other 
international stakeholders to retain the  
 
Figure 5: Global usage and growth in usage of the Internet, by region (2000 to 
2005) 
SOURCE: Data on world population and Internet users from Miniwatts International website, 
September 2005 
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Russia, India, and China) were seeking to increase their influence over global 
administration of the Internet, the new Internet Governance Forum (IGF) was created 
under the auspices of the UN. Figure 5 above gives an overview of growth rates in 
Internet usage in global regions.  
 
3.20 As ICANN has striven to emphasize its international outreach and consultation 
with bodies such as the GAC and the UN, this period can also be characterised by 
ongoing ‘struggles at home’, as one interviewee wryly put it. The recent agreement 
with Verisign, the Registry responsible for running dot.com and dot.net amongst 
others, for renewal of the dot.com contract has undoubtedly created controversy and 
disillusion across the whole ICANN community.. It was generally held across most of 
our interviewees that the Verisign deal essentially came down to the ICANN Board 
conceding to Verisign some potentially very lucrative contractual changes, in return 
for an agreement to settle, a decent financial pay-off, and considerable sums saved on 
legal fees for ICANN.  Again most of our interviewees, including some Board 
members, were either critical or very critical of the Board’s handling of this issue in 
terms of the way it communicated with the GNSO, particularly as the GNSO Council 
had advised against settlement with Verisign at that time.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.21 In May 2006 there has been another example of a Board decision, the rejection of 
the bid by the ICM Registry for a dot.xxx generic domain, which has caused some 
unease across the community about the relationship of ICANN and the US 
Government. A range of interviewees have expressed concern to us about the lack of 
clarity in the decision-making process for this particular application, and more 
recently we have seen members of the Board publicly question the basis of this 
decision. One interviewee suggested to us that the GAC had been used to legitimate a 
decision that had effectively been determined by intervention from the US 
Quote Box 4: On the dot.com settlement 
 
 ‘Sometimes we have to take our lumps’ 
 
‘The process is hard to live with, rather than the decision’ 
 
‘The Board said to the GNSO…you’ll eat it and you’ll like it…and that hurt 
the functionality of the GNSO and sapped its strength’ 
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Government. [It is important to note that this is the view of the interviewee, and not 
necessarily a view held by the authors of this report.] On a wider transparency point, 
the transcript of the Board meeting in which this vote was taken is publicly available, 
and Board members were invited to make a public statement about their voting 
decisions.  
 
3.22 It is perhaps a combination of this realignment of ICANN towards the 
international Internet governance community, management of ongoing legacy issues 
with strong incumbents such as Verisign, and a need to forge an independent and 
constructive relationship with national governments that has led to some degree of 
uncertainty about what the mission of ICANN should be and how it should be set up 
in organizational and strategic terms to deal with such a mission. Some of our 
interviewees have suggested to us that ICANN’s role should actually be a very narrow 
‘technical standards’ one, which involves technical management of the DNS to ensure 
security and stability of the Internet. Such a position is encapsulated by the first of 
ICANN’s stated mission points in its Bylaws, ‘preserving and enhancing the 
operational stability, reliability, security, and global interoperability of the Internet’. 
There is a tendency for some stakeholders, particularly those from the registration 
industry, to hold on to this first mission as foundation for arguments that ICANN is 
extending too far out of its putative ‘narrow’ remit. As gTLD Registries have argued 
in a recent statement about the Verisign settlement: 
 The general policy making authority granted to ICANN to 
preserve the stability and security of the DNS and the legacy 
policy authority […] created a ‘picket fence’ around ICANN 
authority […] ICANN could establish policy and/or best 
practices affecting issues outside the picket fence, but could not 
mandate registry or registrar compliance with such policies. 
 
3.23 There is a potential disconnect between this narrow interpretation of its role, and 
other more widely applicable aspects of its stated mission such as ‘promoting and 
sustaining a competitive environment’, ‘employing open and transparent policy 
development mechanisms’, and ‘remaining accountable to the Internet community’. A 
recurring view amongst some senior and experienced interviewees is that ICANN 
struggles to figure out what it is and what its role should be.  
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3.24 As reiterated above, these issues are strictly out of scope for our study. However 
it is important that historical context and prevailing views, either of unease or 
sometimes anger, are taken into account when considering the current position and 
performance of the GNSO. Although practically all our data collection approaches 
have steadfastly stuck to the GNSO, it has often been the case that people’s views on 
the GNSO have been influenced by more explicit views on ICANN as a whole. Some 
interviewees have equated GNSO with ICANN on the grounds that the GNSO is de 
facto the major constituent part of ICANN. Others have known relatively little about 
the GNSO despite being active participants in the ICANN process in other areas. One 
or two relatively senior officials from ICANN advisory committees have simply 
implied in response to an interview request that a discussion about the GNSO would 
have to be a very short discussion indeed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Quote Box 5: On ICANN’s scope 
 
[ICANN] is not a regulator…neither is it an international policy making body 
like the UN…it has a flimsy legal status… and it relies on the registration 
industry for ninety percent of its revenue. Work that one out. 
 
ICANN has no budget and no power…and it is 
pretending to be somebody 
 
We don’t believe the organization is going in the 
right direction…a mini ITU was never the deal 
 
‘You can’t just say that ICANN only does technical things.  
These things affect national sovereignty and the spirit of  
Independent countries’ 
 
‘There is nothing about the root file which requires an ICANN’ 
Quote Box 6: On ICANN people and doing this Review 
 
 ‘You have to be careful who you listen to’ 
 
‘‘You have to build a more complete picture… 
For 5 or 6 years [ICANN] was the centre of my ****ing universe  
 
‘I’m not sure what the psychological term is…but it is a  
problem when people get too close to things to see clearly’ 
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3.25 The GNSO Review has been a complicated research challenge. The world of 
ICANN and the GNSO is populated with strong views, personalities, and some 
interviewees have suggested or implied, ‘prevailing myths’. There is an inevitable 
paradox at stake in that in order to be able to do justice to a review of the GNSO, it is 
necessary to enter its domain, read the mailing lists, get to know the faces, understand 
its background, and how it ticks. Even one GNSO person told us that ‘no one 
understands the GNSO. I’m trying to understand it myself’. The deeper one goes 
however, the more inclined one becomes to buy into arguments that ICANN (and by 
association the GNSO) is a necessarily sui generis and unclassifiable body which has 
an inherent justification to resist outsiders in the form of ‘consultants’ prescribing a 
usual suspects list of generically applicable remedies for change. One Board member 
suggested to us in interview that  
 
Once you learn about this thing, it becomes very fascinating, 
like a little Petri dish […] Your report needs to show 
awareness of ICANN. You need to make yourself look like 
insiders otherwise it will be dismissed.  
 
It has not been our intention to ‘look like’ anything in particular. In the short 
space of time allowed for this research we have tried to get as many different 
views as possible, to familiarise ourselves as much as possible with the 
personalities, the context, the dynamics, and Bylaws and rules of engagement of 
ICANN. One former senior ICANN person suggested that the ‘GNSO would be 
paranoid that ICANN staff had commissioned this review from the LSE to have 
them recommend closing down the GNSO’. We noted this comment down in the 
same way that we have noted every other one of the hundreds of comments that 
people have given us.  
4. The GNSO  
 
4.1 The primary role of the GNSO is to develop and recommend to the ICANN Board 
substantive policies relating to generic top-level domains (Article 10, ICANN 
Bylaws). We go into detail on the Policy Development Process (known as the PDP) 
below, however at this point it is worth sketching out some of the main areas that have 
been subject to detailed policy work since 2002. Looking at the formal policy 
development work of the GNSO since December 2002 (see Figure 6 below), there are 
four main strands as follows: 
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[a] Transfers and deletions of domain names: Two early pieces of policy work 
culminating in early 2003 related to the actions of registrars and handling of 
registered domain names. The ‘inter-registrar transfer policy’ developed 
standardised procedures covering the way in which a registered domain name 
may be transferred from one registrar to another. This policy, implemented in 
late 2004, divided up administrative obligations on ‘gaining’ and ‘losing’ 
registrars, to reduce duplication of workload and harmful consequences to the 
registrant. The policy on ‘expired domain name deletions’ also had a similar 
objective to reduce the nefarious consequences for registrants who find that 
the registration period on their domain names has expired without their 
knowledge, and that without their knowledge, the domain name has been 
dumped back on the market and purchased by other registrants. This policy 
work set some ground rules for notification of the registrant and a redemption 
grace period.  
 
[b] Procedures and policies relating to the WHOIS database: Since 2001 the 
DNSO and the GNSO have carried out a range of policy-oriented work 
relating to the WHOIS database, and access privileges to this information held 
within. We go into more detail on WHOIS policy work directly below, as this 
has absorbed a large majority of the GNSO workload since 2002.  
 
[c] Obligations under new (and more recently, existing) gTLD Registry 
contracts: In 2004 the GNSO initiated policy work on procedures to  
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Figure 6: Summary of policy development work carried out by the GNSO since 
2002  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ensure that gTLD Registries notify ICANN of any new services or changes to 
service delivery that are introduced. The final report was published in June 
2005, setting out consensus policy on the steps that should be followed by 
GTLD Registries and ICANN staff for reviewing and agreeing to specific 
changes to existing services or introduction of new services. More recently, in 
February 2006, a much larger and potentially more controversial piece of 
policy development work has begun on possible improvements that could be 
made to existing gTLD Registry contractual conditions.  
 
[d] New generic TLDs: In December 2005 the GNSO initiated new policy 
development on procedures governing the introduction of new generic TLDs. 
ICANN selected seven new generic TLDs in November 2001 (a mix of 
sponsored and unsponsored), and then issued a further request for applications 
for sponsored TLDs in March 2004. This new PDP takes a broad look at what 
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types of generic TLD are most desirable, how many should be introduced and 
during what time span, and by which allocation mechanism TLDs should be 
introduced. This is currently one of major pieces of policy development under 
way in the GNSO. Related to new gTLDs, but not quite under way as formal 
policy development work, is the issue of Internationalized Domain Names 
(IDNs). The first ICANN committee was formed back in September 2001 to 
discuss all issues relating to the introduction of IDNs. The ICANN President’s 
Advisory Committee announced at the start of 2006 that ICANN would be 
running a test-bed for the first IDN prototype forms. Now the GNSO Council 
is currently in the process of setting up an informal working group to consider 
key policy issues that will arise from this work on IDNs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Thinking about these policy development issues outlined above, it is worth 
reviewing how the GNSO Council time is accounted for. As an indicative picture, 
Figure 7 below gives a rough indication of the types of issues that have taken up the 
GNSO Council time since June 2003. This Figure consists of some basic content 
analysis of around 1,500 Council mailing list postings, presented year on year. 
Admittedly this is not a completely comprehensive account as it may be that not all 
topics are discussed on the public mailing list, however given that postings average 
around 2 per day over three years, we think that it is a fairly comprehensive picture. 
Three of the four main policy issues outlined above, WHOIS, new registry services, 
and new generic TLDs, account for around one third of Council discussion. Figure 7 
does not include data from 2006, however this would largely have been taken up by 
discussion over new generic TLDs, the new policy development work on amendments 
Quote Box 7: On GNSO policy work 
 
 ‘We have done a lot of proactive policy development’ 
 
‘People are generally happy with the status quo’ 
 
‘It is hard to make policy when interested parties are so involved… 
There isn’t another industry where the incumbents set the pace and the 
agenda’ 
 
‘The Council does not have much output’ 
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to existing gTLD Registry contracts, and other issues such as election of a new GNSO 
representative to the Board. 
 
4.3 Figure 7 indicates discussion on some other important themes already referenced 
in this report. Around 7 per cent of discussions have focused on one of a range of 
issues relating to Verisign, either the decision to reassign dot.net, the legal settlement 
over the contract for dot.com, or the incident in September 2003 when Verisign 
introduced a new service to redirect Internet users making unresolved requests in the 
dot.com and dot.net domains to a dedicated (and chargeable) directory and search 
service (known as ‘Sitefinder’). Just under one fifth of all mailing list discussion has 
focused on a range of issues relating to ICANN-wide strategy or operations (including 
discussion about the ICANN Strategic Plan and annual budgets), GNSO Review 
work, the GNSO operational plan, and the policy development process in general.  It 
is surprising that almost 10 per cent of all mailing list postings since June 2003 have 
related to either the current GNSO Review or the previous review of the GNSO 
Council in 2004. On the strength of this data, it would be hard to say that there were 
low levels of awareness across the GNSO about the current work. There have been 
almost as many postings about WHOIS as there have been about review work.  
 
Figure 7: Main themes discussed on the GNSO Council mailing list, by year  
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4.4 Perhaps the most enduring aspect of the GNSO policy development work has been 
on issues relating to the WHOIS information service. Figure 8 sets out a basic 
overview of WHOIS work. This predates the establishment of the GNSO and can be 
traced back to February 2001 with the formation of the first WHOIS Task Force 
convened to conduct a general review of the service. The final report from this Task 
Force was completed in November 2002 with general guidelines on accuracy of 
registrant data and restrictions on access for bulk marketing purposes. These 
recommendations were adopted by the Board in March 2003. Around this time certain 
members of the original Task Force raised issues concerning privacy of registrant 
contact data, and presented an impromptu report to the Council as a whole requesting 
the need for an ICANN staff report on privacy issues and the WHOIS service. A 
steering group was set up in May 2003, led by the Council Chair and consisting 
almost solely of Council members and key Constituency officials, to oversee progress 
on this work.  It was subsequently decided that even though the original Task Force 
had considered issues relating to restriction of access to WHOIS for marketing 
purposes, the definition of ‘marketing purposes’ had not been defined tightly enough, 
and hence the need for further policy development on these issues. Therefore in 
December 2003 the Council voted to initiate three new strands of policy development 
relating to three separate aspects of WHOIS as set out in Figure 8: 
 [1] Restricting access of WHOIS for marketing purposes;  
[2] Defining which data elements should be collected in the WHOIS 
database; and 
 [3] How to improve the accuracy of WHOIS data in the database. 
It was decided in July 2004 that elements of [1] and [2] above were inter-related to 
such an extent that the two Task Forces should be combined as one, and a year later to  
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Figure 8: An overview of WHOIS Task Force activity since February 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
complete the circle, it was decided that all three Task Forces should be combined in 
one overarching WHOIS Task Force. In June 2005 the decision was made to initiate 
policy development on the purpose of WHOIS data and specific contact information 
collected. 
 
4.5 We have had a range of opinions from our interviewees on exactly how much 
WHOIS has achieved in terms of useful substantive policy recommendations that are 
up-to-speed with wider views and positions held in privacy and data protection 
communities worldwide. Some people have suggested to us that WHOIS represents 
an ‘unravelling process’, in the sense that what started with a relatively 
straightforward review of the WHOIS information service has surfaced a wide range 
of complicated and controversial public policy issues. As one policy thread is pulled, 
unravelling leads to more threads coming loose, and eventually one finds oneself 
having to start from basics once again. One frank view from a former Board member 
was as follows: 
The GNSO has basically spent most of its time on two things. 
One is the WHOIS for which there is no clear solution. 
Because worldwide law enforcement has made it very clear 
that it doesn’t care what ICANN does, it’s going to control that 
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outcome […] so many people view that fumbling around on 
WHOIS as irrelevant […] 
 
A more optimistic line from other people has been that WHOIS represents a process 
of ‘policy learning’ that has laid the groundwork for some important issues to be 
addressed in the coming years. Others meanwhile have suggested that WHOIS is the 
policy product of intractable groups of interests at Constituency level with incentives 
to delay any resolution or minimise the administrative costs of compliance for 
business.  
 
Figure 9: Estimated hours and notional costs of policy work on WHOIS since the 
first Task Force was established in 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Explanatory Note: We estimated total hours spent by Task Force members and Councillors from data 
supplied by the GNSO Secretariat. Task Force members spent on average 8 hours per week. 
Councillors who are members of Task Forces spend on average around 12 hours per week on all GNSO 
related work. We therefore estimate 8 hours per week for these Councillors on the assumption that they 
are involved in other GNSO Council related activity. These are conservative estimates for weekly 
averages, and some Councillors and Task Forces might well spend more time. We calculated total 
hours, and then estimated notional costs using US$180 per hour (again a conservative estimate for 
professional consultants).  
 
 
 
4.6 Regardless of particular perspectives on the impact of WHOIS over the last 5 
years, it is worth considering for a moment the sheer scale of personal resources that 
have been invested in this policy development work. We estimate from figures 
provided by the GNSO Secretariat that a Task Force member (who is not a Council 
member) will spend on average 8 hours per week on Task Force activity. This average 
will of course be taken across very active members and less active members. 
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Similarly we estimate that Council Task Force members will spend roughly the same. 
Figure 9 above provides a crude and probably conservative estimate at just over 
38,000 hours for total time invested in all WHOIS activity since day one. All of this 
time is given up voluntarily by members, although some Constituency members are 
subsidised by their employers. Using a basic notional cost of US$180 per hour, we 
estimate that WHOIS has cost its participants somewhere in the region of US$7 
million over 5 years.  
 
4.7 It is worth putting this indicative cost figure of US$7 million over five years into 
some kind of overall context. Let us briefly step back to consider how the GNSO can 
be contextualized in terms of ICANN revenue and expenditure. How does this 
conservative figure of US$1.4 million per year of notional costs (and this is just a 
majority proportion of all GNSO policy work) compare to the overall situation?  
 
4.8 Figure 10 gives an overview of ICANN revenue by source since 2001. Over this 
period total revenue has increased from US$5 million in 2001 to just under US$25 
million in financial year 2005-06. A rapid increase in revenue is clearly visible. One 
answer to this question lies in the growth of registrar markets, revenue increases in 
registrar payments and contributions to ICANN. Other factors include large one-off 
payments from registries, in 2005-06 for example revenue gained from the dot.net 
agreement with Verisign. Revenue is due to increase significantly again with proceeds 
from the settlement with Verisign on the dot.com domain at the end of 2005. Other 
minor sources of revenue for ICANN came from the country code community in the 
early years after 2000, however ICANN annual financial reports suggest that 
countries were often reluctant to pay contributions, and sums pencilled to the budget 
under country codes have decreased significantly. 
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Figure 10: Breakdown of ICANN revenue by source, by year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTES: Registrars revenue includes the following categories from ICANN Adopted or Approved 
Budgets: ‘Transaction based registration fee for registrars’, ‘Variable Registrar support’, ‘Registrar 
Application fee’, and ‘Annual Registrar Accreditation fee’. Registries revenue includes ‘Fixed Registry 
fees (Tiers 1 and 2)’, ‘Fixed Registry fees (Tier 3)’, ‘New sponsored TLD initial fixed fee’, and 
‘dot.net agreement fees for 2005-06’. CcTLD revenue includes contributions from Tier 1, 2, and 3. 
Other category includes the following: ‘Address registry fees, Contributions, Miscellaneous items’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.9 Figure 11 shows that total ICANN expenditure follows a similar trajectory to  
that of revenue. We were not able to get detailed figures from ICANN staff on the 
proportion of total expenditure that is allocated to the GNSO. We constructed a broad 
estimate based on ICANN published accounts. Again, it was suggested to us that a 
high proportion of ICANN expenditure is allocated to matters relating to interests 
represented in the GNSO not least fighting often expensive litigation action by 
registries and registrars. However this is not strictly the same as expenditure allocated 
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Quote Box 8: On the registration industry and ICANN revenue 
 
 ‘The Registrars wondered whether to send a cheque not to  
ICANN but to their broker to buy Verisign shares’ 
 
‘There is an underlying controversy about how ICANN came to be a 50 
million dollar organization from the five million dollar organization’ 
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to the GNSO policy development work. We estimate that expenditure on staff 
working directly to and with the GNSO, plus related travel and other costs, has grown 
from around 2 per cent of total ICANN expenditure in 2003 to around 6 per of total 
ICANN expenditure in 2005-06. Six per cent of US$25 million is roughly US$1.5 
million, roughly equivalent to the annual notional cost of policy work that has gone 
into WHOIS over the last five years.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: ICANN expenditure on the GNSO as a percentage of total ICANN 
expenditure, by year 
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NOTES: GNSO expenditure estimated as follows: Total minimum staff estimate (2006, 2005, 2004) 
4.85, 2.75, 0.75 Estimated salary cost per head (2006, 2005, 2004) 118652, 96068, 102395 Salary 
cost estimate for GNSO work (2006, 2005, 2004) 575463, 264186, 76796. Travel 2 policy staff to 
travel - 10 trips per year $50,000 each (2006, 2005) 100000, 100000. Premises and overheads 
Equal to salary costs. Advertising and other administrative costs 50000 per year for 2006, 2005, 
2004. GNSO Review 150000. Nominating Committee member travel per year 25000. 
 
 
4.10 ICANN revenue and expenditure issues coincide and indeed collide at times with 
broader scope issues raised above. Registration industry stakeholders make the 
Quote Box 9: On expenditure on GNSO 
 
‘Staff should support the GNSO…but ICANN starves policy to death’ 
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argument that much of ICANN spending is on areas that fall outside or on the very 
peripheries of the ICANN remit (at least the registration industry’s interpretation of 
this remit). As we have heard in many of our interviews with representatives from the 
registration industry, registries and registrars are reluctant to ‘fund’ (given the fact 
that around 90 per cent of total ICANN revenue comes from these stakeholders) 
‘unmandated’ expansion of ICANN’s mission. Again, it is not within the scope of this 
Review to say anything on this subject. However one interesting point on 
prioritization of expenditure emerges from this registration industry discourse. GTLD 
Registries make the point that individual expenditures associated with key projects 
such US$270,000 for IDNs seem ‘very low given their importance for the security 
and stability of the DNS’. They go on to make the point that ‘the amount budgeted for 
translation of ICANN’s own website and brochures is more than the amount shown in 
the budget for addressing the entire issue of IDNs’. 
 
 
5. The Constituencies 
 
5.1 A major part of this research has been to assess the quality of representation of the 
Constituencies, in particular the coverage they get in representing the interests of all 
organizations of their type worldwide, the effectiveness with which they represent 
their members’ interests, and the extent to which the Constituency system as a whole 
functions adequately. We go into detail on each Constituency further below, however 
it is worth briefly characterizing some of the contrasting and enduring opinions across 
the six Constituencies before looking at each in more detail. We designed an online 
survey for Constituency members, primarily to find out about how they viewed their 
own Constituencies and the work of the GNSO in general. This survey was widely 
advertised, and each Constituency member in the Council and any Constituency 
officials or staff support were emailed and asked that their members be alerted to this 
research and encouraged to fill in a survey. We also had our team of 10 LSE graduate 
students working by telephone and by email to identify Constituency member contacts 
and encourage survey completion. There was wide disparity across the six 
Constituencies in the quality of contact details made available for reaching 
Constituency members. Some Constituencies did not supply contact details on 
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grounds of data privacy, and agreed to alert members independently via internal 
channels.  
5.2 Given the internal publicity which the Review has had, the work by our research 
team to increase take up, and in some cases written acknowledgements from 
Constituency members that they would alert their members to the survey, we take the 
view that the response rate received over the two months is a reasonable indication of 
the degree of actual participation in the Constituency process. Figure 12 below sets 
out the number of members each Constituency currently claims, and the response rate 
we have received to date. This response data shows that the registration industry 
constituencies have shown good turn out, especially since this survey is relatively 
detailed and comes with no ‘prize-draw’ incentive for completion (or punitive 
leverage for non-completion). The Non-commercial Users Constituency has also 
shown a solid response rate at one quarter of its members. Business Constituency 
response has been moderately less impressive with only one fifth of members 
responding. Again we might give this response the benefit of the doubt given time 
pressures and the fact that we could not identify Constituency members other than 
Council member representatives responding. At the bottom end of the table, Internet 
Service Providers show a response rate of one fourteenth.  
 
Figure 12: Response rates to our survey for Constituency members 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3 With a total survey response of 3 in every 10 members it is just about possible to 
draw some conclusions from the wider dataset on views across Constituencies. As the 
response rate from the some Constituencies is pretty low, little can be drawn from the 
survey on views from these Constituencies.  
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Figure 13: How our survey respondents rated the degree of ‘effective 
representation’ and ‘actual influence’, by Constituency (N = 107) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4 Figure 13 above draws on 107 survey responses in total, including Constituency 
responses and data from responses by individuals with knowledge of ICANN and 
GNSO processes. It shows survey respondents views on two variables, first how 
effectively each Constituency represents the interests of its member group, and 
second, how much actual influence the Constituency has over policy development in 
the GNSO. The Registrars clearly score most consistently highly on both variables, 
suggesting good degree of representation and high influence to boot. This may be 
explained by the fact that almost half the population is made up of Registrar 
constituency members, but this would also correspond with other findings in this 
report on Registrar participation at Constituency level. GTLD Registries and IP 
Constituencies tend to score relatively highly on both variables too, suggesting that 
there is a pretty good degree of consistency between representation and influence. 
This somewhat contradicts the survey response rate data for the IP Constituency 
above, suggesting that there is a decent level of active participation at IP Constituency 
and just possibly a level of apathy on responding to our survey. The Non-commercial 
Constituency shows almost perfect consistency between representation and influence, 
even if the level of influence is deemed to be lowest across all Constituencies. The 
Constituencies with the largest negative deficit, in terms of perceived lack of 
representation in relation to actual influence, are the Business Constituency and the 
ISP Constituency.   
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5.5 These views provided by our survey respondents are of course perceptions held, 
and may not necessarily reflect the actual quality of representation and degree of 
influence across the Constituencies. One way of evaluating how comprehensive 
Constituencies have been in recent years in collecting and conveying views of their 
members is to evaluate the range of written Constituency statements. These are 
available on some Constituency websites, but they are also usually copied or 
summarised in final policy reports. We got our student researchers to find all current 
Constituency statements published on Constituency websites, and where missing, to 
search for Constituency statements integrated into final reports. We reviewed these 
documents to find out what degree of detail was available on the extent of 
participation across Constituency members. Figure 14 below summarizes our findings 
using different coloured ticks to represent different findings (see key below the 
figure). Our researchers spent almost 24 hours in total searching and documenting 
these statements. They are not available centrally in one place (surprisingly), and so 
we trawled thoroughly, probably more so than most uninitiated browsers would be 
able to endure in looking for information on Constituency positions.  
  
5.6 The BC and IP Constituencies have relatively detailed and comprehensive written 
statements on their positions available on their websites (respectively, 
www.bizconst.org and www.ipconstituency.org). The BC in particular has a wide 
range of documents across most of the key issues mentioned above (some of which 
present views, which are jointly across the IP and ISP Constituencies). The IP 
Constituency also has a comprehensive approach to publishing its views on its 
website. The Non-Commercial Constituency has a good range of documents also, 
mainly on issues related to WHOIS. The gTLD Registries Constituency not only has a 
pretty good range of written statements available on its website, but also contains 
information on the number of Constituency members who have contributed to 
formulating the position. We could find only two other examples of specific data 
published on contributing members (both shown in red), one very recently in a 
document produced by the Registrar Constituency on amendments to conditions of 
existing gTLD Registry contracts, and one from the BC around 4 years ago for a 
statement on evaluation of new generic TLDs. We found very little information 
available on either one of the Registrar websites, or the ISP website, giving specific 
information on Constituency positions.  
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Figure 14: The availability of written statements from Constituencies on 
particular positions 
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      
2004 
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WHOIS 1 Apr       
WHOIS 2  Apr       
WHOIS 3 Apr       
Comments on proposed new sTLDs May       
Dot.net reassignment  May       
2005 
WHOIS 12 Conflict resolution        
WHOIS 12 Notification and consent Jan       
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IDNs        
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 Written statement found on the Constituency website 
 Written statement found as part of an overall report of a Task Force of the GNSO 
Council 
 Written statement found with data on the number of Constituency members voting 
 
5a. Registrar Constituency 
 
5a.1 The Registrar Constituency represents the views and interests of professional 
domain registrars that have been accredited by ICANN to act as Registrars for the 
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generic domain name space. At the time of writing there were around 530 such 
registrars. This excludes organizations with registrar functions whose primary 
relationship with ICANN is as a gTLD Registry. Registrar Constituency member 
organizations are required to designate a registered representative who has authority 
to speak on behalf of, and vote on behalf of, her member organization. Members may 
also appoint any number of additional representatives to the Constituency (known as 
Non-Registered Representatives) who have privileges as observers. The Constituency 
publishes details of its membership and contact details on its website. It has four 
elected one-year officer positions (Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer, and Technology 
Officer), and appoints three representatives from separate ICANN geographic regions 
to the GNSO Council. GNSO Council representatives may only serve 2 consecutive 
2-year terms. The Registrar Constituency have a dedicated website, however 
confusingly there are two separate sites (presumably one new and one old) with two 
separate URLs. 
 
5a.2 Figure 15a shows the distribution of accredited registrars by number of 
registrations and global region. There are around 530 accredited registrars, however 
this is perhaps slightly misleading, as many of these named registrars are essentially 
owned and run by the same organizations, and in reality, there are around 200 bona 
fide organizations existing behind this total accredited registrar number.  The skew 
towards North America is also exaggerated by this factor, however it is certainly the 
case that in terms of registrations, North American companies dominate registrar 
markets in the gTLD space. The total number of gTLD registrars increased steadily 
year on year from around 80 in 2001 to around 160 in 2004.  
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Figure 15a: Number of accredited registrars and registrations held, by global 
region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5a.3 Looking at the membership of the Registrar Constituency in Figure 15b it 
appears to incorporate a relatively nicely balanced mix of large and small registrars, 
as well as a decent spread of registrars legally registered in geographic regions other 
than North America. Comparing Figures 15a and 15b it is noticeable that the 
distribution shape has almost reversed, in the sense that membership tends to be more 
common for larger registrars, and relatively fewer of the medium-sized category 
registrars figure. One interviewee who is affiliated to the registrar constituency 
offered this summary of the registrar market segments: 
There are the big guys…the million plus club…for example, Arcom, 
Tucows, Register.com, Schlund and GoDaddy. Their interests are 
aligned in volume discounts…Then there are the niche players, ‘taste 
testers’ for example…Then there are the regional web-hosting 
companies with 25,000 to 100,000 domain names. They are a good 
barometer…the moral centre of the registrar. 
 
Looking at Figures 15a and 15b together, this ‘moral centre’, the registrars between 
25,000 and 100,000 tend to figure relatively well on the Constituency membership list 
at roughly 30 out of 80. One small volume registrar from the Middle East known as 
TAGI Domains is an interesting recent addition to the membership list (especially 
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since other incorporated parts of this organization are affiliated to the Business and IP 
Constituencies).  
Figure 15b: Registrar Constituency members only 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5a.4 Comparing Figure 15b with 15c below the distribution of survey respondents is 
not bad either. In total we had 37 registrar responses out of possible 56, and these 
responses achieved good coverage in terms of size and type of registrar, as well as 
global regional spread. 
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Figure 15c: Registrar Constituency members responding to our survey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5a.5 The Registrar Constituency has an expansive archive of its mailing list dating 
back to June 2003, with over 6,000 postings in total and average of between 5 and 6 
postings per day. This incidentally is three times the size of the GNSO Council 
mailing list. As mentioned already, some basic tallying of mails can reveal quite a lot 
about the level of intellectual activity in the Constituency. Figure 16 below presents a 
simple tally of total postings per half year over 3 full years, total individuals 
contributing, and number of postings by the top 10 contributors (as a guide to strength 
in depth of the discussion). It is interesting that total postings per half year has 
decreased steadily from around 1,000 to 200 with a slight blip in the second half of 
2005 largely due to the general outrage that was felt across the Registrar community 
at the dot.com settlement terms between ICANN and Verisign. It is also the case that 
the proportion of total postings made by the top 10 contributors has increased, 
suggesting a consolidation of the communication between central personalities (this 
does not necessarily mean these top 10 every half year are the same individuals). The 
number of total contributors however has remained stable at around 40 or 50 per half  
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Figure 16: Number of postings made to the Registrar Constituency mailing list, 
by year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
year. Given the membership of the Constituency is 56, again this is a relatively decent 
rate of sustained communication (assuming a small proportion of contributors may be 
other than member organization representatives). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5a.6 It is interesting to look at how Registrar members viewed the relative quality of 
representation provided by other Constituencies in the GNSO, and their overall 
influence. Again it is important to remember that this is perception data, and a 
significant few of the Registrar respondents revealed that they only participated 
infrequently in policy development process and in general had relatively little to do 
with the GNSO process once Constituency statements had been formulated. 
Nevertheless, the results in Figure 17 below show some interesting, if slightly 
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Quote Box 10: On the Registrar Constituency 
 
‘The Registrars are not incumbents…there is lots of competition between 
them’ 
 
‘Unlike some of the Constituencies, the Registrars are not frozen in time…they 
are a dynamic group’ 
 
‘It is hard to make policy when interested parties are so involved…There isn’t 
another industry where the incumbents set the pace and the agenda.’ 
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predictable perceptions. The most obvious contrast with Figure 12 above showing 
perceptions from all respondents is that the Registries Constituency is viewed as being 
much less representative than it is influential. It is seen as the most influential 
Constituency in fact. The Business and Internet Service Provider Constituencies retain 
roughly the same scores, showing a representative deficit compared to influence. 
Registrars however see the Intellectual Property Constituency as much less 
representative than average overall. These results might be explained by the ongoing 
controversy between the registrars and the Intellectual Property Constituency over the 
purpose of WHOIS. 
 
Figure 17: How the Registrar survey respondents rated the degree of ‘effective 
representation’ and ‘actual influence’, by Constituency (N = 37) 
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5b.1 The Registry Constituency represent the interests of gTLD Registries who are 
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Global Name Registry Ltd (dot.name). Figure 18 below gives an overview of the 
number of registrations under each of the domains at the end of 2005.  
 
5b.2 The Constituency then has a further seven Registry members representing 
‘sponsored’ gTLDs, names that can only be applied for by organizations that are 
specific to a certain functional or professional area such as educational institutions, 
aviation industry stakeholders, mobile phone operators and so on. These gTLDs are 
managed and indeed sponsored by designated bodies with expertise and advocacy 
relations with the specific range of bodies included under the domain. For example, 
the sponsoring body for the gTLD dot.museum is the Museum Domain Management 
Association. This domain can only be applied for by museums, situated anywhere in 
the world. Sponsored gTLDs are limited to specific and finite population of relevant 
bodies, and therefore are generally have far fewer registrations that unsponsored 
domains, which are open to all registrant individuals and organizations. Sponsored 
domains at the end of 2005 include dot.museum (around 500 registrations), dot.coop 
(around 6,500 registration), dot.aero (around 4,000 registrations), dot.jobs, dot.mobi, 
dot.travel, and dot.cat (Catalonia). The Registry has other non-voting members as 
observers, such as the ICM Registry responsible for the recently rejected dot.xxx 
application. 
Figure 18: The largest generic top-level domains by registrations and number of 
registrars accredited for each 
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5b.3 The Registry Constituency has an executive management structure consisting of 
a Chair, Vice Chair, and a Liaison to the Registrars Constituency. There is a 
Secretariat responsible for day-to-day operational support such as processing 
membership applications, collecting fees, and managing the Constituency website. 
Council members are elected by simple majority vote. All votes other than GNSO 
Council elections require majority support by unsponsored members with each 
member having one vote (even Verisign), and majority support by sponsored 
members again with each members having one vote. Majority support of all members 
must also prevail according to the following system. If there are N voting members, 
the member with the largest number of registrations under management will be 
allocated 10N votes, with next largest 10(N-1) and the next 10(N-2) and so on.  
 
56.4 The Registry Constituency meets via teleconference every other week for around 
two hours. An agenda is usually prepared 48 hours in advance. The Secretariat 
prepares minutes from each teleconference that are issued via the Constituency 
mailing list. Neither minutes nor mailing list submissions are available publicly so we 
were unable to do tally analysis on the level of activity on this list or check attendance 
at teleconference meetings. The Constituency publishes positions statements listing 
how many members were consulted and posting statements contributing to the overall 
position. For all voting on Constituency positions the procedure outlined in the 
paragraph above is used.  
 
Figure 19: How the Registry survey respondents rated the degree of ‘effective 
representation’ and ‘actual influence’, by Constituency (N = 10) 
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5b.5 Views on the relative quality of representation and actual level of influence 
across Constituencies from the perspective of Registry Constituency members show 
some interesting diversity again. Perhaps most impressive is the near perfect score 
given by the 10 Registry respondents on the extent of their own effective 
representation. This near perfect score does however suggest at least some degree of 
unity and coherence across the members. Perspectives on actual influence of the 
Registries show the lowest score across all the Constituencies. The opposite 
perspective is shown for the Business and Commercial Constituency, where again 
influence is seen as high and effective representation as low. The ISP Constituency is 
seen as low on both accounts. Solid views are expressed about the Registrars and the 
IP Constituency, both of whom are seen as relatively effective representatives and 
pretty influential too.  
 
5c. Intellectual Property Constituency 
 
5c.1 The Intellectual Property (IP) Constituency represents the views and interests of 
owners of intellectual property worldwide with particular emphasis on trademark, 
copyright, and related intellectual property rights and their effect and interaction with 
domain name systems. In the Constituency Bylaws specific mention is made of 
ensuring the rights of ‘minority views’ within this wider representation activity. The 
current membership of the Constituency as of the end of 2005 totalled 98, divided up 
into 20 international representative bodies, 10 national bodies, 24 corporate law firm 
observers, and 44 individual observers. International members include major 
representative associations such as the International Trademark Association (INTA), 
International Association for the Protection of Industrial Property (AIPPI), and the 
Quote Box 11: On the Registry Constituency 
 
 ‘Verisign could be likened to an 800 pound gorilla in a tea shop…and a 
surprisingly nice one at that’ 
 
‘As a smaller Registry, a way of doing things was imposed on us…we pay 
thousands of dollars to ICANN as an insurance payment that is completely 
irrelevant to what we are trying to do’ 
 
‘The Registry Constituency is genuinely representative’ 
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American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA). Amongst these 
international members there are also more area-specific organizations such the 
National Music Publishers Association (NMPA), Motion Picture Association of 
America (MPAA), and the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers. 
The international mix of member organizations is relatively wide, with just over half 
of the total members from North America, one third from Europe or Asia Pacific, and 
around one tenth from Latin America or Africa. This breakdown applies roughly to 
the major international member list as well.   
 
5c.2 Member organizations may designate one representative and up to two 
alternative representatives from international and national members on the IP 
Constituency Council. No decisions in the Council may be taken without the 
representation of at least one quarter of international and national members. Only 
international and national bodies may vote. Each international member has 3 votes 
and each national member has 2 votes. Simple majority decisions under this allocation 
of weighted voting will count in order to decide Constituency positions. The IP 
Constituency holds at least one face-to-face meeting per year. The Constituency 
Bylaws say nothing about teleconference meetings. There is a relatively strong 
executive management structure to the Constituency, including a President, Vice 
President, Treasurer, a Secretary, plus three further officers. Any officer may not hold 
a seat for more than three consecutive terms. An IP GNSO Council representative 
may not hold an IP Constituency seat for more than two successive terms. However in 
both cases, if no successor is found, the incumbent holds the seat until she can be 
replaced. 
 
5c.3 The IP Constituency publishes minutes of meetings on its website, however it is 
not entirely clear whether this list of publications is exhaustive. We analysed all 
minutes of meetings dating back to 2002 to get a sense of how many members were in 
attendance, and how attendance has fluctuated year on year. Figure 20 below shows 
this data for teleconference meetings listed and for face-to-face meetings (details of 
the number of meetings are given below). Each bar shows the average number of 
members attending each meeting per year. It is interesting that face-to-face meetings 
in 2002, 2003 and 2005 have all averaged around 20 participants. Teleconference 
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meetings have fluctuated more, with only 10 participants in 2005 compared to 40 at 
one teleconference in 2002. No data is available for 2004. 
 
Figure 20: Attendance at the Intellectual Property Constituency meetings, by 
year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The IP Constituency meetings recorded on the their website show the following totals: 2006 no 
minutes available; 2005 5 teleconferences and 3 face-to-face meetings; 2004 no minutes available; 
2003 no teleconference and 1 face-to-face meeting;  2002 1 teleconference and 3 face-to-face meetings. 
 
5c.4 Comparing the individuals and organizations participating in the IP Constituency 
teleconference and face-to-face meetings since 2002, and the current IP Constituency 
membership, it is possible to get a relatively reliable overview of the scale and range 
of organizations actively represented. Figure 21 shows the proportion of current listed 
members of the IP Constituency (as of end of 2005) that have been present for at least 
one teleconference or face-to-face meeting since 2002. The pattern shows a high level 
of active representation amongst large international bodies, with 17 out of 20 having 
participated in person at least once since 2002. The proportion drops significantly for 
national members listed, and somewhat inevitably observer members (corporate law 
firms and individual observers) show around one third of members having been 
actively represented at a meeting.  
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Figure 21: Proportion of current member and observers to the IP Constituency  
(in white) who have attended IP Constituency face-to-face or teleconference 
meetings at least once since 2002 (shown in red or blue) 
 
 
 
 
5c.5 In order to establish which of these 20 major organizations were most actively 
represented in IP Constituency meetings, we looked at the number of times that 
specific individuals had been present at teleconference or face-to-face discussions 
since 2002 (a total of 13 meetings for which data is available). We created a top 10 
list of individuals who had been most active (i.e. attended the most meetings), and 
looked at which major organizations they were representing. Figure 22 shows that 
probably the most consistently active representative body has been the International 
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Quote Box 12: On the IP Constituency 
 
‘Members of the IPC represent all the premier organizations in the world’ 
 
‘ICP is the biggest anomaly in the Constituency structure – it is completely 
issue based’ 
 
‘The IP Constituency is the purest form…in that they know what their interest 
and position is’ 
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Trademark Association (INTA) with two individuals in the top 3, a Former President 
of the Constituency and current Secretary of the Constituency. The Coalition for 
Online Accountability also figures strongly, and is currently led by the President of 
the Constituency (members listed below). In general, we find affiliations to major 
international intellectual property bodies and corporations relatively firmly rooted at 
the core of the Constituency. It is unfortunate that we were not able to stimulate more 
response from these member organizations in our online survey.  
 
Figure 22: The top 10 attendees at IP Constituency meetings and the 
international and national associations they have represented 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The Coalition for Online Accountability consists of representatives from the following 
organizations: American Society for Composers, Authors and Publishers, Business Software Alliance, 
Broadcast Music Inc, Motion Picture Association of America, Recording Industry Association of 
America, Software and Information Industry Association, Time Warner Inc, and Walt Disney 
Company 
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5d. Business and Commercial Users Constituency 
 
5d.1 The Business and Commercial Users Constituency (BC) represents any legally 
recognised for-profit entities that have been delegated a domain and that uses the 
Internet to conduct for-profit business, or any organization such as a trade association 
representing these entities. At the end of 2005 the BC had around 33 member 
organizations. There are around 12 representative associated members, with a 
declared membership of 60,000 companies worldwide in total, around 80 per cent of 
which are SMEs. This membership group includes very large associative bodies such 
as the Computing Technology Industry Association (CompTIA), World Information 
and Technology Service Alliance (WITSA), and national associations such as the 
Mouvement des Enterprises de France (MEDEF). There are a further 21 named 
corporations or SMEs ranging from small single-person business consultancies and 
lobbying enterprises to large and well-known multinational corporations such as Time 
Warner, Fujitsu Ltd, Nokia, Unilever PLC, Yahoo! Inc, and until recently AT&T. The 
BC provides the following breakdown: 52 per cent global companies; 18 per cent 
global associations; 18 per cent associations operating in one ICANN region; and 12 
per cent SME.  
 
5d.2 The BC GNSO Council representatives fulfil the role of officers to the 
Constituency and the function of an executive committee. Unlike all Constituencies 
reviewed above, there is no separation between executive officer positions such as 
President or Chair of the Constituency and those of GNSO Council representatives. In 
the BC Constituency, the same individuals fulfil executive and legislative roles. There 
is however a professional secretariat responsible for day-to-day administration of the 
Constituency and its website.  
 
5d.3 The BC meets at least 9 times per year either by teleconference or face-to-face. 
Minutes and notes of meetings are made available on the website; however 
Constituency mailing lists are not made public. Constituency positions are initiated by 
an appointed rapporteur, circulated around members, and if there are no substantively 
opposing comments received during a 14-day period, the position is deemed 
approved. A coalition of at least three members may oppose a position, and trigger 
further discussion (either by email or teleconference), and if the majority of discussion 
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members support the draft position, the position will be deemed approved. If there is 
continued disagreement from at least 10 per cent of paid members, the issue will go to 
a vote of members (presumably one member one vote). Voting on issues appears to 
follow a simple majority rule, with organizations receiving votes according to its class 
of membership; Companies or associations spanning more than one ICANN region = 
3 votes; Associations spanning one ICANN region = 2 votes; and small enterprises 
with less than 10 employees and turnover of less than 0.5 million = 1 vote. 
  
Figure 23: Attendance at Business Constituency meetings, by year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The Business Constituency meetings recorded on their website show the following totals: 2006 
3 teleconference and 1 face-to-face meeting; 2005 4 teleconferences and 2 face-to-face meetings; 2004 
2 face-to-face meetings; 2003 1 teleconference and 3 face-to-face meetings; 2002 2 teleconferences and 
3 face-to-face meetings. 
 
5d.4 We looked at all minutes of BC Constituency meetings made available on the 
Constituency website since 2002. We found 24 sets of minutes in total, considerably 
less than the 9 meetings per year as stated in the GNSO Review Questionnaire 
response to ICANN staff at the start of 2006 (nevertheless we are aware of 
administrative resource barriers that might hinder full provision of up-to-date and 
complete copies of Constituency meeting minutes). In a similar way to the analysis of 
the IP Constituency meetings above, we looked at the average number of people 
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attending BC meetings each year, distinguishing between teleconference and face-to-
face meetings. Figure 23 above shows a relatively steady attendance of somewhere 
 
 
 
 
 
 
between 8 and 13 year on year.  
 
5d.4 We looked at the current list of member organizations of the BC Constituency 
and compared this with minutes data from 24 meetings showing which organizations 
(i.e. individuals representing organizations) were present. Figure 24 below shows a 
distribution of attendance across three major types of member organization, medium 
and small enterprises, representative associations, and large corporations. We have 
included seven organizations which are no longer members, explaining why the total 
is 40 rather than 33. Only five organizations show attendance at more than 16 out of 
24 meetings (marked dark blue). It is also striking that for each of the three categories 
at least half of the organizations have only attended five or fewer meetings, and in the 
case of representative associations and SMEs this proportion is around three quarters. 
Just under one fifth of large corporations and around one third of representative 
organizations listed as members have never attended a meeting.  
Quote Box 13: On the BC Constituency 
 
‘It is obvious they don’t represent world business…but they are generally 
representative’ 
 
‘Why would individual businesses bother? Why would they care?’ 
 
‘It is very easy to get lost amongst loud voices in the BC’ 
 
‘The BC is run by four or five people’ 
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Figure 24: Number of meetings attended between 2002 and 2006 by BC member 
organizations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The Business Constituency meetings recorded on their website show the following totals: 2006 
3 teleconference and 1 face-to-face meeting; 2005 4 teleconferences and 2 face-to-face meetings; 2004 
2 face-to-face meetings; 2003 1 teleconference and 3 face-to-face meetings; 2002 2 teleconferences and 
3 face-to-face meetings. 
 
5d.6 Given the range of commercial organizations listed as members of the BC 
Constituency, we might expect to see this range covered when looking at the Top 12 
attendees at BC meetings since 2002 and the organizations that individuals have 
represented. The table in Figure 25 below takes the Top 12 individuals in terms of 
their attendance records at the 24 meetings, notes their Constituency position (Column 
1), the number of meetings they have attended (Column 2), and the organization they 
represent. The mix of top ranking represented organizations appears at best a little 
miscellaneous, not exactly household names, and although one or two big brand 
names appear, they tend to be towards the bottom of the table and have largely IP 
based interests.   
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Figure 25: The top 12 attendees at BC Constituency meetings and the 
commercial and membership organizations they have represented 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5d.7 Looking at how BC Constituency members responding to our survey viewed 
other Constituencies, the quality of their representation, and actual influence over 
GNSO policy development, we see again in Figure 26 below a somewhat predictable 
pattern emerging. It is important to remember that these results are based on 7 
responses, which would not constitute a statistical sample by any stretch; however 
averaging scores across the 7 respondents gives at least some indication of views. 
Perhaps not surprisingly the BC members rate their representation and influence 
highest across all Constituencies. They view the Registrar Constituency in much the 
same terms as themselves, scoring highly on both aspects. Unusually though the 
gTLD Registries are seen as having the largest disparity in terms of low quality of 
representation and high actual influence. The Non-commercial Constituency score 
lowest on both counts.  
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Figure 26: How the Business constituency survey respondents rated the degree of 
‘effective representation’ and ‘actual influence’, by Constituency (N = 7) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5e. Non-Commercial Users Constituency 
 
5e.1 The Non-Commercial Users (NCU) Constituency represents the views and 
interests of civil society stakeholders who engage in non-commercial speech and 
activity on the Internet. Membership organizations should be incorporated as a non-
commercial entity or operate on a not-for-profit basis, and be the exclusive user of at 
least one domain name. As of March 2005 it has 40 member organizations spanning a 
wide range of interests such as education, community organizing, promotion of the 
arts, public interest policy advocacy, children's welfare, religion, scientific research, 
human rights and the advancement of the Internet as a global communications system 
for all segments of society. As one NCUC member put it, ‘the Constituency is defined 
by the ‘non’ label rather than unifying things […] except for the UDRP’. The 
Constituency has an executive structure consisting of a Chairperson, an Executive 
Committee consisting of a Secretary-Treasurer and five regional representatives. 
Executive officers may serve no more than three one-year consecutive terms on the 
Executive Committee. There is also a Policy Committee, co-chaired by the NCU 
GNSO Council representatives, with responsibility for developing Constituency 
policy positions for input to the GNSO Council.  
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Re
gis
tra
rs
gT
LD
 
Re
gis
trie
s
No
n-
co
m
m
er
cia
l
ISP
Int
elle
ctu
al 
Pro
per
ty
Co
m
m
er
cia
l a
nd 
bu
si..
.
Effective representation
Actual influence
© LSE Public Policy Group Strictly confidential draft 63 
5e.2 The membership elects the Chair, the regional representatives, nominates 
representatives for executive positions, and can initiate and vote on policy work 
within the Constituency. Organizations with membership of less than 1,000 or less 
than 200 employees have one vote each. Organizations with more than 1,000 
members or 200 employees have two votes. For officer elections, the person with the 
most votes wins, and then other slots are allocated to the second, third, and so on. 
New members are asked to pay two years of dues before joining. The current dues are 
US$50 for small organizations, and US$100 for large organizations. Organizations 
wishing to join from countries with GDP per capita of less than US$10,000 can apply 
to the EU for a waiver or reduction in the membership fee. All NCU Constituency 
meetings are open to the public depending on the Executive Committee’s discretion, 
and mailing lists are available on the NCUC website.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5e.3 Again, a useful indication of the dynamics of a Constituency is the mailing list, 
and so we carried out some basic tallying of contributions to the list for every half 
year from June 2003 to June 2006. Figure 27 below shows the number of mails posted 
to the list has dropped relatively steadily from over 300 to around 200, which 
averages at least one per day. The number of contributors has followed a relatively 
stable rate around 25 to 20 (equivalent to just over half the current membership). 
There are indications, like most of the other Constituencies, that a smallish core of 
leaders tend to account for a relatively high proportion of the postings, and in this 
case, we see that the Top 5 (one eighth of the members) contributors account for 
around two thirds of the postings.  
Quote Box 14: On the NCU Constituency 
 
‘The main challenge is how to survive if ICANN don’t have an institutional 
framework to make participation work’ 
 
‘The NCUC is looking very weak…like a spare wheel’ 
 
‘The NCUC interestingly is as it should be…it is probably the most 
representative Constituency’ 
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Figure 27: Analysis of the NCU Constituency mailing from June 2003 to June 
2006, showing number of contributions each half year, and number of 
contributors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5e.4 Examining the membership activity in more detail in Figure 28 below, it is clear 
that there are relatively clear leaders in this Constituency. Nevertheless it appears also 
from looking at the Top 12 contributors that there is good activity in depth. The 
twelfth highest contributor (3 per cent) has sent around 50 mails to the list over this 
three year period. The range of member organizations involved is also relatively wide, 
with good global coverage and an eclectic mix of educational institutions, non-profit 
issue organizations, civil liberties groups, and even a law firm.  
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Figure 28: Top 12 contributors to the NCU Constituency mailing list, their roles 
within the Constituency, and the organizations they represent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5e.5 Looking at the relative perspectives of NCU Constituency members responding 
to our online survey, we get a rather straightforward picture of how these members 
view their own representation against their overall influence on GNSO policy. 
Perhaps not surprisingly they view themselves as the most effective in terms of 
representation of their members. The Intellectual Property Constituency is seen as 
both highly representative and highly influential, perhaps a reflection of the number of 
free speech and media privacy advocates within the NCU Constituency. It is perhaps 
also surprising that the NCU Constituency do not view the registration constituencies 
particularly highly in terms of representative quality, particularly as our interviews 
with NCU officials suggested that gTLD Registry and Registrar Constituencies were 
reasonably effective. It might be that NCU Constituency members are comparatively 
less knowledgeable about other Constituencies than NCU Constituency officials.  
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Figure 29: How the NCU Constituency survey respondents rated the degree of 
‘effective representation’ and ‘actual influence’, by Constituency (N=11) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5f. Internet Service and Connectivity Providers Constituency 
 
5f.1 The Internet Service and Connectivity Providers (ISP) Constituency represents 
the views and interests of the Internet Service Provider community worldwide. It has 
a membership primarily consisting of representative associations, however individual 
entities can join as long as they are ISPs and, as it states on the web charter, ‘can 
demonstrate that the activities of the DNSO [sic] commercially affect themselves’. 
The Constituency has an executive committee to which each member organization 
designates one representative. This committee elects all representative officers in the 
Constituency, and votes on substantive policy positions of the Constituency. There is 
also a management structure consisting of five officers, including a Chairperson. 
Officers serve terms of 2 years and no more than two consecutive terms (i.e. 4 years 
in total), while the term of service of the Chairperson can be flexible. The term of 
office for GNSO Council representatives is 24 months, and no representatives can be 
elected for more than two successive periods. Constituency meeting take place as the 
Chairperson considers necessary, or if at least 20 per cent of delegates vote to convene 
a meeting.  
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5f.2 At the end of 2005 the ISP Constituency listed 42 member organizations of their 
website. These organizations represented a relatively strong global spread including:
 -  Around 20 representative associations or individual  
   corporations in Europe, including British Telecom, Deutsche  
   Telekom, and EuroISPA (Europe’s largest association of ISPs); 
- 7 North American corporations; 
- 6 organizations from Africa, Asia, or Asia-Pacific; 
- 2 Latin American ISPs; 
We found that around half of the contact details for members listed on the ISP 
Constituency website were out-of-date, making it very difficult indeed for us to reach 
named contacts. This reflects a problem with much of the other material on the 
website being out-of-date, for example the Constituency Charter refers to the former 
Domain Name Supporting Organization (DNSO) and the Latest News section consists 
of stories from 2002. The ISP Constituency does not have a Secretariat, hence there 
will be limitations on how comprehensive the website can be, however details 
currently available make it extremely hard to identify members, get their contact 
details, and download other recent documents on Constituency positions.  
    
Figure 30: ISP Constituency mailing list contributors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5f.3 Mailing lists for the ISP Constituency are available on the GNSO website, so in 
order to establish whether representatives from these 42 organizations are playing any 
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we carried out a simple tally of mail postings since September 2003. Figure 30 shows 
the number of postings per half year period, and the number of contributors.  
The total number of mails posted since September 2003 was 241, with the lowest 
amount per half year at 20, and the highest amount per half year at around 80. It is 
perhaps more interesting that the most contributors in any one half period is only 
eight. At low periods, this figure drops to four, and on closer inspection of the 
individuals contributing, we find that it is the three ISP Constituency representatives 
to the Council, and the ISP Constituency Secretariat. So, over a course of three years, 
only 4 other members have made postings to the Constituency lists with a total of 40 
emails. It is difficult to ascertain to what extent other discussions are taking place 
within the Constituency, and it may be that the mailing list is only used sporadically 
or occasionally. We could not however find any other information which suggested 
more dynamic activity amongst members. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Views on participation 
 
6.1 We found a range of reasons why organizations participate in the GNSO. The 
registration industry of course has a direct business incentive to be active in the 
GNSO. Major Registries and Registrars will often have paid designated 
representatives to the GNSO, and this tends to ensure high levels of activity and 
visible presence. It was generally obvious to most of our interviewees why the 
Registries and particularly Registrars have tended to be the most responsive to our 
surveys, and indeed one of the most vocal (and mostly vibrant) Constituencies in our 
experience at the annual conference in Wellington. Most of our Registrar interviewees 
made the point that when 90 per cent of ICANN revenue comes from the registration 
stakeholders, it is hardly surprising that these Constituencies will be active 
participants in the process.  
 
Quote Box 15: On the ISP Constituency 
 
‘ISP is another anachronistic Constituency…it had to be there at the start’ 
 
‘I can count on one had the number of ISPs who are on the list and are aware 
of the Council’ 
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6.2 As part of our online research our students were asked to identify major 
organizations across a range of sectors and global regions, find relevant contacts at 
these organizations, and invite them to visit our website and fill out a survey from a 
non-member perspective. We contacted over 1,000 organizations. We received 12 
responses. Figure 31 below shows how these respondents assessed different benefits 
of participating in gTLD policy development through ICANN. Despite this 
disappointing response rate, the top three benefits seemed to correspond quite closely 
to views that we have heard from our interviews.  
 
Figure 31: How our non-member survey respondents rated various benefits of 
participating in policy development for generic top-level domains (gTLDs).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 Encouraging diversity of language and culture
across the Internet
Extending the benefits of the Internet to less
developed parts of the world
 Improving the financial wealth of your
organisation
Protecting the intellectual property interests of
your organisation
Helping to shape the future of the Internet
 Ensuring security and stability of the Internet
Average score on a Likert scale from 1 to 7
Quote Box 16: On participation in the GNSO process 
 
‘If there were one hundred thousand members of Constituencies…all 
participating in elections online…then I would be more inclined to listen to the 
views of the GNSO’ 
 
‘It is just not realistic to stick to these bottom-up consensus goals’ 
 
‘People do not get up in the morning and want to vote on routing…they want 
to use the Internet, they don’t want to run it’  
 
‘Nobody believes in the GNSO…why would you go there?  
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6.3 Ensuring the stability and security of the Internet scored highest. Our interviews 
have generated a wide range of comments of varying degrees of candour about how 
for most organizations, commercial and non-commercial, participation in policy 
development for generic Top Level Domains is just not a high priority. As one 
interviewee summed up, ‘ninety nine point nine per cent of organizations don’t care 
how and why the Internet works, they only care that it works’. Even interviews that 
we have conducted with organizations currently listed as Constituency members, 
GNSO and ICANN issues are just not top priority, and for most, struggle to be even 
third or fourth level priorities.  
 
6.4 Another important benefit is protecting intellectual property interests. Much of 
this research has shown that IP interests have been an sustained presence in much of 
what the DNSO and the GNSO has done since 1999. Discussions around WHOIS and 
the introduction of new gTLDs are directly relevant to IP interests, and there is a 
discernible core of stakeholders both watching over and participating in policy 
development. Much like the registration stakeholders, the IP Constituency clearly has 
a direct commercial interest in participating in the GNSO. People have suggested a 
range of incentives, from generally pace with policy change (or lack of it), influencing 
policy in a way that will reduce risks for their clients, and as some cynical views have 
suggested, to ensure continued stability and growth in the market for IP legal 
representation services.  
 
6.5 It is clear that narrow commercial interests or individual affiliations explain much 
participation. For example, it is common that individuals involved in the GNSO will 
be listed as representing an organization, but it may be that the actual link with that 
organization is pretty tenuous. In other words, it is the individual specifically that is 
the substantive link and not necessarily the organization at large. Individuals move 
organizations and as a result bring their new organization into the GNSO process (on 
paper at least). Other narrow commercial interests can also explain why certain 
organizations participate. For example, new applicants for sponsored gTLDs are 
expected to be visibly active in the work of GNSO in the lead up to the application 
assessment. It is also possible to link large commercial organizations that are 
members with specific applications for new sponsored gTLDs. We have even been 
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inclined to suspect a link (only once or twice) between interviewees’ enthusiasm to be 
interviewed and impending elections to official positions across the Constituencies.  
 
6.6 It is interesting that ‘helping to shape the future of the Internet’ scores second in 
Figure 31 above. Many of the interviewees we have met over the course of this 
research, and indeed people we have spoken to at the ICANN Wellington meeting, 
could be described as issue-based participants. For many, issues such as privacy, 
education, free speech, global development, drive participation, particularly for the 
Non-commercial sector and the At Large membership, are reasons for their 
participation in ICANN. There are also interested participant individuals who were 
involved in the early days of development of the Internet during the mid-1990s, and 
who continue to play a part.  
 
Figure 32: How our non-member survey respondents assessed reasons why they 
are not currently members of an appropriate GNSO Constituency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTES ON COMMENTS GIVEN: 1.There are too many committees and constituencies with 
overlapping missions. Its confusing in a way. 2. We are not familiar enough to what GSNO does. 3. We 
are not familiar with your activities. 4. I suggest that the home page of ICANN display more 
information or publishes information in such a way that we find it accessible and useful. We only knew 
about ICANN's different committees after we attend few international meetings. 
 
 
6.7 Figure 32 above suggests some reasons why organizations would not participate in 
the GNSO. Again the averages are taken from only 12 organizations, so they have 
almost no statistical significance. However it is interesting that the two most 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Generic domain name policy is not a primary
or core concern for our organisation
 There are more effective ways to influence
policy on generic domain names
The costs of participating in the relevant
Constituency outweigh the benefits
We were not aware of the GNSO
Constituency system
 It is difficult for an organisation like ours to
influence these kinds of issues
Average score on a Likert scale from 1 to 7
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important (even if very marginally so) were that organizations viewed it difficult to 
influence these kinds of issues, and that organizations were just not aware of the 
GNSO Constituency system. Some of the comments in the notes below are telling, 
particularly given that these organizations are interested enough in Internet 
governance issues to go to the trouble of getting a password from us and completing a 
survey.  
 
7. Transparency and visibility 
 
7.1 Perhaps a phenomenon that is relatively predictable in the light of the recent 
decision by the Board on the dot.com renewal agreement is the extent to which 
Constituency members are relatively supportive of their Constituency structure, the 
GNSO and its work, but much less positive about the extent to which the ICANN is 
seen to be responsive to the GNSO as a whole. In our survey we asked Constituency 
members to score responsiveness and representation of the various parts of the policy 
development process from the Constituency level up to the Board. It is not necessarily 
the absolute figure which will be important here (as different people will attach 
different values for different weights of preference), so what we focus on are the 
 
Figure 33: How Constituency members viewed representation in the GNSO  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 The ICANN Board takes into account the views of
your Constituency in key decisions
Your Constituency’s views are understood by other
ICANN Supporting Organizations
 Your Constituency takes account of the views of all
[organisations of your type]
Your Constituency represents the views of its members
to the GNSO Council
Your Constituency takes account of the views of your
organisation
Average score out of 7
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relative scores across each of the five questions. The striking relation is the extent to 
which members score the Board at an average of 2.6 compared to their Constituency 
and the Council at 4.3. It is important to note here, as with every item that we present 
from our survey, that over half of the respondents featured in Figure 33 above are 
Registrar Constituency members. Given that this Constituency was probably the most 
vocal on the perceived injustice of the dot.com agreement, it is perhaps not surprising 
that the Board was strongly criticised on this. Statements from other Constituencies 
have confirmed a general dissatisfaction with the way in which the Board 
incorporated the views of the GNSO into this decision. A statement from the BC is a 
broadly illustrative example: ‘the settlement defines a process for new registry 
services that is different to the process already agreed through GNSO consensus 
policy development […] This sets a bad policy precedent that might constrain the 
future policy development of the GNSO’.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.2 We have been unable to get data on usage figures of the GNSO website, however 
most of our interviewees when asked to comment on the site, gave us a range of 
opinions from ‘it could be improved’ to ‘the site is a chaotic mess […] there's plenty 
of info, but there is very little organization, making it very difficult to find what you 
are looking for’. People frequently suggested that the site served a very clear purpose 
as a vital working tool for insiders, and the use of mailing lists and the assiduous 
approach to posting documents and referencing other materials indeed confirms this 
view. One Constituency respondent in our survey suggested ‘the GNSO also has 
Quote Box 17: On the relationship between the GNSO and the Board 
 
‘There is inadequate communication between the GNSO and the Board…it in 
breach of the ethics of the bylaws’ 
 
‘Closed meetings, no feedback, and certainly no dialogue on how to modify 
policy’ 
 
‘The GNSO has developed an inferiority complex’  
 
‘In most firms, the employer doesn’t sit round bitching about 
performance…that is what happens between the GNSO and the Board’ 
 
‘There are interests who talk to the Board by back channels…that’s everybody 
in fact’ 
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several highly informative mailing lists’. Nevertheless people were also very clear 
that the site is confusing for newcomers wishing to find out about the GNSO, and 
labyrinthine in terms of identifying how policy issues have developed over time and 
how documents relate to this development. Another respondent summed this up: 
People get confused about whether they are commenting on a 
"preliminary report" or a final decision, etc., etc. Only the well-
organized, professional lobbying groups can navigate this easily. 
 
We asked our survey respondents to tell us how often they visited the GNSO website. 
Given the fact that three in every ten Constituency members actually completed a 
survey, we would expect this group of people (or organizations) to be amongst the 
most frequent visitors to the site. Figure 34 below however shows a rather depressing 
picture of usage in that only one third of these more enthusiastic Constituency 
members visited the site at least once a month. One third confessed to visiting the site 
less than once a year or never.  
 
Figure 34: How often our survey respondents visited the GNSO website 
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8. The GNSO Council 
 
8.1 Since December 2002 the GNSO Council has been subject to three separate 
reviews (including ours). In December 2004 the Council voted to approve a self-
review document, which gave a detailed summary of the work carried out by the 
Council over two years, issues of geographical outreach and transparency, policy 
development process schedules, ICANN staff support to the Council, implementation 
and compliance, voting, and communication with other ICANN bodies. A very 
similar looking independent review followed the self-review document. Ironically, the 
independent review was perhaps less critical than the self-review, evidence of keen 
self-evaluative culture within the Council at the time. In mid 2005, an internal staff 
document recorded the extent to which recommendations from these reviews had been 
progressed. In our Figure 35 below, we take the recommendations from the 
independent review, and based on discussion with the author Patrick Sharry and our 
own impressions based on 4 months in-depth research, we have ordered them 
tentatively in three categories depicting progress in implementation.  
Quote Box 18: On the GNSO website 
 
‘It needs sprucing up…it is not good at reaching out to potential members’ 
 
‘The only good thing about the GNSO website is the Google search engine’ 
 
‘There is no one place where you can find a helpful list of things which the 
GNSO has done’ 
 
‘Difficult to absorb the content…and the thread of discussions’ 
 
‘The website is a disaster…just disgraceful’ 
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Figure 35: Recommendations from the independent review of the GNSO Council 
in 2003 and impressions of progress  
 
8.2 Our interviews generally confirmed that links between the GNSO Council and 
other ICANN organizations were getting stronger, particularly due to more formalized 
and regular meetings such as the joint meeting between the GNSO and the GAC that 
took place on the first day of the conference in Wellington in March 2006. We found 
that links between the ALAC and GAC through designated representatives seemed to 
be working well (although there is still no formalised process for seeking input from 
other ICANN supporting organizations). A new wave of ICANN policy staff now 
supports the work of the Council, and one dedicated policy officer is integral to the 
Council in terms of editing and developing policy documents and carrying out other 
support. In fact, much of the increase in the proportion of ICANN expenditure 
allocated to the GNSO over the last two years is taken up by salaries for 2 to 3 new 
policy staff much of whose time is committed to supporting the GNSO Council. The 
liaison between ICANN legal staff and the Council is also stronger, and it is fairly 
common to see General or Deputy General Counsel on Council teleconference calls 
for specific legal matters that require elucidation. Other more straightforward points 
Overhaul the GNSO website 20 
Explore way in which the Nominating Committee can add value to the Council process17 and 18
Utilize the Ombudsman as a source of systematic analysis of complaints16
Establish a service level agreement between the GNSO Council and ICANN staff10
Using facilitators to build consensus more effectively in the Council7
No progress
Build in a review of effectiveness of policies made to the Board15
Put in place a compliance function plus graded penalties13
Develop a formal process for seeking input from other ICANN organizations on policy work6
Developing ways in which people from non-English backgrounds can participate more 
actively
4
Increasing representation in the Council from all ICANN global regions3
Some progress
Change the bylaws to incorporate three Constituency representatives19
Ensure the viability of each policy recommendation made to the Board12
Work with ICANN General Counsel to ensure that the GNSO Council is well briefed legally11
Put in place high calibre ICANN support staff – ensure effective handover8 and 9
Revising and clarifying stages of the Policy Development Process5
Building closer links between the GNSO Council and other parts of the ICANN structure2
Good progress
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such as changing the ICANN Bylaws to accommodate three Councillors per 
Constituency have been achieved.  
 
8.3 Our interviews and survey work surfaced a range of issues covered by the 2004 
review where either some or little progress has been made. Developing ways in which 
people from non-English speaking backgrounds can participate effectively in the 
activity of the Council was a subject that came up relatively frequently. Participating 
in Council teleconference calls requires a strong command of English (not to mention 
a degree of self-confidence), and some members suggested to us that the face-to-face 
meetings were valuable sessions as they offered a chance for more general 
relationship building. The Council make-up displays a wide range of representatives 
from different countries, however the requirements to have a strong command of the 
lingua franca requires that this cultural mix will essentially skew towards English 
speakers. 
 
8.4 One positive aspect of the GNSO website is the extent to which meetings and 
minutes are made readily available to the public on the GNSO mailing list. We 
analysed minutes of 68 meetings (a total of nearly 123 hours) between January 2002 
and April 2006 (roughly 15 meetings per year) in order to get a sense of attendance by 
Councillors, Councillor ‘churn’, and presence of other related ICANN people. Figure 
36 below gives an overview of attendance, absence with proxy, and absence either 
with or without apology. It is worth noting that the Nominating Committee members 
were not represented on the Council until June 2003. The gTLD Registries show 
almost full attendance either in person or by proxy. The BC and the Registrar 
Constituency follow closely behind. The IP Constituency members and the NCU 
Constituency members have the least number of presents on teleconference and face-
to-face meetings. It is often a barrier to attendance for NCU members who have to 
find the funds from their own pockets to attend Council meetings in far flung corners 
of the world. This was undoubtedly a contributing factor to low turnout for this 
Constituency in Wellington earlier this year. 
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Figure 36: Attendance at GNSO Council meetings since 2002, by Constituency  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.5 The GNSO Council section of the ICANN Bylaws (Article 10, Section 3) 
stipulates that the regular term of each GNSO Council member shall begin at the 
conclusion of an ICANN annual meeting and shall end at the conclusion of the second 
ICANN annual meeting thereafter. The regular term of one representative selected by 
each Constituency begins in an even-numbered year and the regular terms of the other 
two in an odd-numbered year. This suggests that one should see at least signs of ‘2 
and then 1’ turnover of Councillors year on year. This may not always be the case, as 
Councillors may hold office until a successor has been found, and some 
Constituencies have their own rules about allowing members to serve consecutive 
terms (as set out above). Figure 37 below colour codes the number of actual changes 
in personnel year on year for each Constituency. None of the Constituencies show this 
regularity of pattern. The gTLD Registries are perhaps most consistent with at least 
one change each year and three in 2003. The IP and NCU Constituencies show 
periods of great change during 2002 and 2003, and then settle in later years. The BC 
Constituency is least prone to change, with only one since the establishment of the 
GNSO Council and one prior to this in 2001.  
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Figure 37: Number of changes of GNSO Council representatives, by year 
 
 
 
8.6 As mentioned above the GNSO Council mailing list is an active and completely 
open resource both for Councillors and for other interested observers. Obviously there 
is much communication that takes place ‘off list’, and it is often the case that 
participants will explicitly (and often legitimately) express a preference for taking a 
discussion into private. Since June 2003 the Council mailing list has seen over 2,400 
postings from a total of 52 different people, at an average of around 69 postings per 
month. Just under two thirds of all postings have come from GNSO Councillors. The 
previous two figures above give an indication of the extent to which Councillors from 
different Constituencies are present at Council meetings and the extent to which new 
Councillors are introduced into the community. Figure 38 below shows the proportion 
of list postings coming from different Constituencies, broken down by half year 
periods. It is clear from this data that the Council Chair has played a consistently 
active role in leading discussions as one might expect. By far the most vocal of 
Constituencies however has been the BC Constituency, responsible for around 18 per 
cent of all postings. It is interesting that in the first half of 2006, the Nominating 
Committee members have greatly increased their voice, as to a certain extent have the 
Registrar Constituency.  
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Figure 38: Postings made to the GNSO Council mailing list by type of 
contributor, by periods of 6 months 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.7 A further trend worth noticing has been the increase in participation in Council 
activity by ICANN staffers and, to a certain extent, representatives from other ICANN 
organizations. As noted above, a new wave of ICANN policy staff supporting the 
Council has taken place during the last 18 months, and this is clearly visible in the 
previous figure (shown in red). As our interviews have confirmed, this reflects not 
only a relative increase in ICANN staff involved in substantive development of policy 
development documentation, but also perhaps an increasing need to have other 
expertise and oversight involved in Council discussion. Board members elected by the 
Council have also shown a small but visible presence on the mailing list, with a peak 
around the middle of 2005, presumably to do with decisions around the renewal of the 
dot.com agreement amongst other things.  
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Quote Box 19: On the relationship between the Council and ICANN staff 
 
‘You need experienced senior staff to train juniors…ICANN employ too few 
staff with too little experience’ 
 
‘It has been difficult to work with these policy staff…in theory it is a very 
valuable role’ 
 
‘Staff members do not always get treated fairly by Council 
members…Councillors often to behave as if they own the staff’ 
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Figure 39: Attendance at GNSO Council meetings by type of attendee, by year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.8 Looking again at the data from attendance at Council teleconference and face-to-
face meetings since 2001, the increase in the number of ICANN staff and other 
representatives is clearly noticeable (Figure 39). The first half of 2006 shows a jump 
in the average number of people present on calls (including three LSE researchers 
some time in March).  These calls have averaged around 10 extra people over and 
above the regular Council members. This may be largely to do with the new policy 
development process on the introduction of new gTLDs, a process which is being run 
under relatively new executive procedures involving editorial and ‘leverage’ work by 
these core ICANN policy staff. Also a new PDP on amendments to existing 
contractual conditions of gTLD Registry services has sparked some initial controversy 
over scope, and has required in-depth briefing from General Counsel and his staff. A 
further interesting detail is that the ‘Other ICANN organizations’ category includes 
the country code community (amongst others), which after December 2002 left the 
Names Council and established its own structures. Country code representatives, as 
well as liaisons from the ALAC and the GAC make up this visible segment of 
participants (shown in yellow). Many of our interviewees suggested that as 
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Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs) become more of a policy priority, these 
other participants may well increase in number in relation to regular Council 
members.  
  
9. Policy Development Process 
 
9.1 The Policy Development Process (PDP) sets out the rules and timelines for how 
the GNSO Council develops its policy positions. Figures 40a to 40c attempt to convey 
the intricacies of the PDP in crude algorithmic form, detailing the necessary steps (in 
three manageable chunks) from initial raising of a new issue through to the GNSO 
vote to pass policy recommendations to the ICANN Board. The emphasis is on tightly 
stipulated time periods, which peculiarly are defined at the micro-level in the ICANN 
Bylaws (Annex A). These are indicated where relevant in the three Figures below. 
The PDP starts with the ICANN Board, the Council (with a vote of at least 25 per 
cent) or an Advisory Committee raising a policy issue for development. This triggers 
a staff report (including advice from General Counsel on scope and other legal 
matters), which goes to the Council for review. If the ICANN Board originally 
surfaced the issue (denoted by Path 1), the Council has no choice but to begin the 
PDP. Otherwise the Council requires 33 per cent support to begin the PDP (or 67 per 
cent if staff have recommended against it). The day on which the PDP starts (labelled 
‘PDP Day’) acts as the milestone for all future time schedules. The first public 
comment period runs from PDP Day for 20 days. This part of the process is in 
theory 30 days (plus 20 days for public comment). 
 
Figure 40a: An overview of the initial stages of the  Policy Development Process 
(PDP) 
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9.2 At PDP Day the Council must decide on whether to launch a Task Force to carry 
out the main policy development work or whether to use ICANN policy staff to 
develop the report, as it is known ‘a committee of the whole’. ICANN staff suggested 
to us that Task Forces were generally used for narrower, more focused pieces of work, 
and the committee of the whole approach for wider and more expansive policy work. 
The three WHOIS Task Forces in 2004 may illustrate focused pieces of work around 
specific issues. However it is hard to see how the most recent combined Task Force 
123 equates to this rationale.  
 
Figure 40b: An overview of the Task Force stage of the Policy Development 
Process (PDP) 
 
 
 
9.3 Figure 40b shows the alternative Task Force or non-Task Force routes. The 
Council requires a majority of at least 50 per cent to launch a Task Force. Once 
decided, the Council must develop a Charter and Terms of Reference, while 
Constituencies are asked to nominate Task Force members. Constituencies may 
nominate any appropriate person to a Task Force, nevertheless data presented below 
shows that most Task Forces have consisted of either Council members or 
Constituency executive officials. The staff manager convenes the first meeting, and a 
Chair is voted in. Constituency statements must be submitted to the Chair within 35 
days of PDP Day, and the Chair must submit a report within 50 days of PDP Day. The 
committee of the whole process is managed primarily by ICANN staff, who 
themselves are responsible for writing the final report. Either way this part of the 
process is in theory 50 days (from PDP Day). 
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9.4 The final stage of the PDP involves a second public comment period running from 
finalisation of the report, and then the submission of the updated report to the Council 
within 10 days of the end of the public comment period. The staff manager 
incorporates the views of the Council into the report, and then a vote is taken in the 
Council. A super-majority vote (66 per cent) is required. The report is passed to the 
Board for agreement and adoption. If the Council has reached super-majority, the 
Board may only veto policy recommendations with a vote of 66 per cent or above. 
This part of the process is in theory around 50 to 60 sixty days (depending on 
Board meetings scheduling). 
 
Figure 40c: An overview of the final stage of the Policy Development Process 
(PDP) 
 
 
9.5 As a means of getting a broad impression of stakeholders’ views of the PDP, we 
included a question in our survey asking people to score different aspects of the 
process on a Likert scale from 1 to 7. We listed eight distinct (but not exhaustive) 
components of the PDP as shown in Figure 41 below. Again it is the relative scores 
across all eight aspects that give valuable information about how people view 
strengths and weaknesses. We counted the number of times factors ranked highest or 
joint highest, and the number of times they ranks lowest or joint lowest, and took the 
net score. Generally our survey respondents thought that the main strengths of the 
PDP were delivering practicable recommendations to the Board, making good use of 
policy support, and picking the right issues (whatever they may be). They were less 
enthusiastic however about scoping work appropriately, ensuring a wide range of 
views, and sticking to agreed time lines. We explore these issues further below.  
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Figure 41: How our survey respondents viewed different aspects of the PDP 
 
 
9.6 The issue of such prescribed timelines has been an issue for previous reviews of 
the GNSO (see above), and the general consensus of opinion is that the PDP takes 
longer. As one survey respondent put it ‘the Council does tend to keep to time 
schedules agreed by the members, but does not keep to the timelines in the Bylaws’. 
Other interviewees have suggested that given the volunteer, part time, and consensual 
nature of the Council, it is inevitable that the PDP will overrun. At a more general 
level, a good number of interviewees implied that there was indeed a general 
tendency, as (one put it ‘a kind of fixation’) to couch process and policy output in 
terms of definite time periods of the kind seen in the PDP. This was often not helpful 
or realistic. One illustration of this referred to specific policy recommendations 
adopted by the Board as a result of the new registry services PDP, which called for 
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Quote Box 20: On the PDP 
 
‘It doesn’t take much to start a PDP’ 
 
‘Protocol is often used as an excuse for lack of production…to slow things 
down’ 
 
‘No PDP has been completed on time so far’ 
 
‘It is all about process management…not management by objective’ 
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national government competition authorities to provide advice within 45 days. This 
interviewee reflected on whether any national governments (let alone their 
competition authorities) had actually been consulted about this recommendation as in 
his view ‘no government competition authority does anything in 45 days!’ 
 
9.7 Some people suggested that one possible affect of this kind of micro-management 
is that the process becomes inward-looking, particularly as the need to meet timelines 
is prioritised over work to get a wide range of views from their members. One of the 
more pessimistic comments we received characterised the process as follows: 
If the time period for discussion is 60 days, not one single 
document will be made in the first 58 days […] then someone 
generates a one-page statement, a few minor edits are made, no 
vote is taken […] and that constitutes a Constituency statement. 
 
We looked at our survey responses for some kind of indication of whether this kind of 
pessimism on the extent of participation in the PDP might be justified. To what extent 
do members of Constituencies feel that they are actively participating in policy 
development work? Again we remind readers of the limited response we have had in 
this survey. Nevertheless from this population, proven to be amongst the more 
enthusiastic participants, there are signs that actual participation is extremely limited. 
Figure 42 below shows the responses from just over 50 Constituency member 
organizations on the question of how often they participate in a PDP. Just fewer than 
50 per cent of respondents said that they had either never participated or only 
participated very rarely in a PDP. Not surprisingly, almost all organizations 
represented by Councillors said that they participated in every PDP.  
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Figure 42: How often Constituency members and Councillors participate in a 
Policy Development Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9.8 We encountered a range of views about the diversity and mix of participation 
involved in policy development work. Some of our interviewees suggested that a 
major weakness is that the same individuals take part in many PDPs, and this limits 
the diversity of views and can encourage inward-looking and self-affirming policy 
outcomes. As one interviewee suggested, ‘this often produces results that were desired 
by involved individuals rather than their Constituencies as a whole’. We heard similar 
iteration around this theme, where the impression was that the same people had 
succeeded in influencing ongoing rounds of policy development to their own ends. 
Others tended to be more sanguine about the participation process, suggesting that in 
a well-functioning GNSO the right people should be in the process already through 
the Constituency system and that the need for supplementary external expertise should 
therefore be limited.   
 
9.9 We analysed the mix of participants involved in the six WHOIS Task Forces and 
the Privacy Steering Group (as shown in Figure 8 above) to get a sense of who is 
taking part and whether there is sufficient turnover and renewal of participants. We 
looked at 122 representative seats across these seven committees, and found that 
roughly two-fifths were GNSO Council members, and three-fifths representatives 
from the Constituency executive structures and membership. Figure 43 gives an 
overview of the number of representatives that each Constituency has had involved in 
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WHOIS Task Force work, and the number of times each representative has served 
across the seven different TF/groups. Given that Task Forces have merged twice (as 
shown in previous Figure 8), we reckon that participation in 3 Task Force would be an 
average level of involvement. 
 
Figure 43: Analysis of individuals taking part in WHOIS Task Forces, by 
Constituency  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9.10 In terms of numbers of the individuals representing each Constituency on the 
Task Forces and Steering Group, the IP, NCU and Registrars have 9 each, closely 
followed by gTLD Registries. When calculating the total number of representative 
seats held by each Constituency however (i.e. number of individuals × number of 
groups they have served on), we find that Registries and Registrars both have 19 
seats, BC and IP have 17 each, with NCU at 15 and ISP at 13. This may confirm the 
view that those individuals who have a direct business incentive to participate will 
inevitably be better represented. The NCU case is interesting as this Constituency 
shows a high degree of diversity in terms of getting different faces involved, but fills 
fewer seats on Task Forces. This may be simply to do with limited time and resources 
within this Constituency given that representatives are generally not financially 
subsidised. The BC is the only Constituency which has a member who has been 
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involved in every WHOIS group. The ISP Constituency is the only one with fewer 
individuals (4) than groups (7).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
9.11 One opportunity for infusing the PDP with comments and views external to the 
Council and Constituencies is the invitation for public comment. As the Figures above 
show, there are generally two periods of public comment in each PDP, one just after 
PDP Day and the other after publication of the final report. In order to gauge the 
strength and diversity of this comment, we carried out some basic analysis of public 
comments received on six separate PDPs, in terms of the origin of these comments, 
the number, and the total word count (as some indication of comprehensiveness). 
Figure 44 below shows that by far the most popular public comment session was the 
original Uniform Domain Name Resolution (UDRP) managed by Working Group A 
of the DNSO in 1999. The bulk of these comments came from interests broadly 
representing the domain name holders (shown by DNH in the table), who felt that 
they had not had adequate access to the development of the policy, which took place 
under the responsibility of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and 
that it should be reviewed within the structures of the Names Council under the 
DNSO.   
Quote Box 21: On Task Forces 
 
‘Volunteers are disinclined to write policy…progress on Task Forces is 
constrained by the fact that policy writing has to be done’ 
 
‘It is all the same people…you never see any new faces’ 
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Figure 44: How respondents scored different aspects of the Policy Development 
Process in our survey 
 
Note: We analysed each public comment and based on the content and the person submitting the 
comment, we tried to give a broad categorization to show roughly how public comments stacked up. 
‘Detailed’ comments were not necessarily partisan to any one grouping and generally sent from 
individuals. We use this as a default category for comments which do not fall into other groupings. 
DNH stands for Domain Name Holders, and includes comments from this general perspective. 
IP/Business includes all comments from interests representing large business or intellectual property 
organizations. Registries and Registrars include comments from known representatives of these 
registration industry stakeholders. This is of course a rough categorisation. 
 
9.12 Since the original UDRP public comment process there has not been an 
equivalent level of response for any public comment processes held. It is interesting 
that looking down the list of contributors for each of the three WHOIS public 
comments sessions, it is possible to pick the same names and indeed organizations, 
many of which are either Constituency members, executive officers, or 
representatives to the Council. A general impression of these data is that the public 
comments periods have primarily been an opportunity for Constituencies to find a 
way of reiterating the same positions (or elaborating on them) that have been made 
through the Constituency statement component of the process. The PDP of new 
registry services received a paltry eleven comments, a good number of which were 
from Registrar Constituency members. The PDP on new gTLDs has revived the 
public comment process to some extent, at least in terms of numbers of contributors. 
It has still only received 52 contributions compared to over one hundred for the 
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original UDRP, nevertheless it is the only PDP listed which has received comments 
from all groupings of Constituents, illustrating a relatively wide relevance across all 
GNSO Constituencies.  
 
9.13 Our interviewees and survey respondents raised the issue of scope in terms of 
what the Council should be launching PDPs on, and what it should not. This 
effectively raises the question of what counts as policy. Some of our interviewees 
suggested that the scope of the GNSO should be a narrow one limited largely to 
policy issues relating directly to technical and management aspects of the DNS. As 
one interviewee pointed out ‘we should not attempt to jam all consideration of all 
issues into the GNSO […] The Board must recognize that policy recommendations 
and analysis can and should come from outside of the GNSO and be prepared for 
narrow recommendations to come from the GNSO’. Other comments along these 
lines suggested that the Council has a tendency to get involved in what are effectively 
contractual issues between providers and ICANN. The problem from this point of 
view is that ‘there is no limitation on scope […] and issues that the Council deals with 
are largely those that its members have business or political reasons to consider’.  
 
9.14 Others suggested that initiation of PDPs can often be traced back to isolated 
events. For example, people have suggested that the PDP on new registry services can 
be explained by a need to respond to the Verisign ‘Sitefinder’ situation, and more 
recently, the new PDP on amendments to existing contractual agreements is a direct 
response from the Council to the dot.com settlement with Verisign. This raises 
implications for the scope of the PDPs and the extent to which a PDP is seen as ‘the 
only tool in the Council box […] and it is a blunt tool at that’. For example, as one 
interviewee from one of the smaller Registries suggested: 
The gTLD Registry Services Contract PDP has been launched 
on the basis of the Verisign settlement, a very bad context. It 
also suffers from the inappropriate attempt to treat all TLDs in 
the same fashion rather than to look for ways to delegate the 
policy-making whenever feasible. 
 
9.15 Interviewees have suggested to us that work carried out by the GNSO can often 
be traced back to issues relating to Verisign. The policy development process on how 
to review and control for new services introduced by existing gTLD Registries for 
example can be traced back to a decision by Verisign in September 2003 to redirect 
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Internet users who had made unresolved requests for a particular second-level domain 
in the dot.com and dot.net space to a dedicated (and chargeable) Verisign directory 
and search service.  This led to criticism of Verisign by ICANN on the grounds that 
this action was taken unilaterally and was considered a serious threat to the stability 
of root. Verisign withdrew the service pending future investigation.  
 
9.16 A further example of policy development deriving from Verisign action is the 
most recent PDP in early 2006 focusing on amendments to contractual conditions of 
existing contracts with gTLD registries. This comes in the wake of the much 
publicised and highly controversial decision by ICANN to settle new terms for the 
dot.com registry contract with Verisign, despite a request from the Council to 
postpone any settlement until the details of the contract could be reviewed by the 
GNSO.  This is a good example of how action of the Council can run counter to 
strongly held views by one or more Constituencies. It is gLTD Registries in this case 
who have set out the following statement on scope of this work: 
Unless those who object to (the dot.com settlement) can make 
a reasonable case that the disrupted terms and conditions 
threaten ICANN’s ability to preserve interoperability, stability, 
and security, they are not properly the subject of ICANN 
consensus policy making.  
 
Registries go on to say however that ‘while undersigned registry operators 
believe that the answer is a rather emphatic ‘no’, we have no objection to a 
serious debate on the question’.  
 
9.17 Another issue that was raised in the independent review is the extent to which 
policies made by the Council are reviewed for effectiveness once they are in 
operation. Many of interviews with Council members reaffirmed this points, 
suggesting that almost all the policy development recommendations that had gone to 
the Council in recent years had not been subject to follow up work or review. In our 
survey we asked respondents to identify strengths and weaknesses of recent examples 
of policy development work, such as the Expired Domain Deletion PDP and work on 
WHOIS accuracy and bulk access. A common weakness raised was the lack of follow 
up work carried out. One respondent from the Registrar Constituency summed this up 
by suggesting that the main weakness is the ‘lack of measurement done after the 
policy is implemented to measures the effectiveness of the policy […] The expired 
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domain deletion PDP was developed to deal with a specific issue (i.e. registrars failing 
to delete names properly). There has been no analysis on whether registrars are 
complying with this policy’. 
 
10. Voting and policy consensus 
 
10.1 There is a strong democratic principle at the heart of the policy development and 
operational culture of the GNSO. As illustrated above in the review of Constituency 
structures and procedures, voting is integral to selection of Constituency 
representatives to the Council and executive officers. Voting procedures are also 
stipulated for all policy consensus work across Constituency members. Some 
Constituencies have relatively straightforward one-organization-one-vote systems 
while others use more weighted systems taking into account factors such as size and 
market share. Some Constituencies insist on term limits for their executive officer 
positions and for their Council representatives, while others tend to take a freer 
approach to terms of service for their elected representatives. In the GNSO Council 
voting is equally, if not more, central to ‘daily’ business.  Councillors are called to 
vote on all manner of procedural and substantive issues. They are called on to vote for 
the Chair of the Council each year, and to vote in two Board Directors (Seats 13 and 
14) as when necessity arrives.  
 
10.2 Between January 2003 and October 2004, Councillors participated in 63 separate 
votes across 23 Council meetings, an average of just under three votes per meeting. 
We analysed this voting in more detail to get a sense of the types of issues that were 
subject to votes. We grouped each vote in terms of whether it was a procedural vote or 
something more substantive on policy or decision relating to questions to the Board. 
Figure 45 below indicates three types of procedural vote (marked in red): 
1. Decision to form or dissolve a committee or a working group; 
2. Decision on a matter of process relating to general Council work (for 
example, appointments, thanks, fund transfer)  
3. Decision on a matter of process relating to a PDP (including both Task 
Force issues and ‘committee of the whole’) 
We also grouped three general types of more substantive votes (marked in blue): 
4. Agree to progress to the next stage of a PDP; 
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5. Request to the Board or request to communicate with the Board; 
6. Substantive policy issue or vote on policy recommendations. 
 
 
Figure 45: Analysis of voting in the GNSO Council between January 2003 and 
October 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10.3 We conclude from these indicative groupings that just over half of all votes taken 
during this period were of the more procedural kind. There were around 14 votes that 
were what we would class as votes on substantive policy or elections to the Council 
Chair or ICANN Board (one quarter of all votes taken). It is perhaps also surprising 
that there were only ten votes taken to progress to the next stage of a PDP within a 
period of 20 months. Given that there were at least four full PDPs in progress during 
this period, and the PDPs as suggested above are generally set to last around 6 
months, we might have expected a few more votes in this category given that there are 
at least four separate points in a PDP where the Council will vote to continue to the 
next stage. We counted votes to defer vote to the next meeting as a procedural vote 
relating to the PDP (point 3 above). 
 
10.4 In order to get a picture of the level of disagreement or abstention across 
different types of votes, we calculated the incidence of ‘No votes’, ‘Abstentions’, and 
‘Did not vote’ for all votes cast (1,254 in total) between January 2003 and October 
2004. This revealed a remarkably low rate of disagreement across Constituency 
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members of the Council, even on votes that we grouped as substantive policy votes or 
elections to the Council or Board. Figure 46 below reproduces the same groupings or 
types of vote, but now shows at the tip of each bar the number of ‘No votes’, 
‘Abstentions’, and ‘Did not vote’. Surprisingly the highest number of No votes came 
in the top category [Group 3 above] on procedural issues around PDP. These tended 
to be disagreement across the Constituencies on whether to delay Council votes on 
initiating a PDP. There were very few ‘No votes’ on substantive policy issues (Group 
6 above], although there are some abstentions, which may have been the result of 
disagreement. We were not able to gain access to voting records from 2005 and 2006 
despite a number of requests. One ex-Board member suggested that ‘one of the 
shortcomings of the Council is that they act too much like a legislative body’. The 
number of votes passed, often on the seemingly most trivial of items, would certainly 
support this.  
  
Figure 46: Analysis of ‘No voting’ and ‘Abstentions’ across all 1254 individual 
votes cast by Councillors between January 2003 and October 2004  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10.5 The low level of disagreement shown in this sample of Council voting (January 
2003 to October 2004) is surprising when one takes into the broad diversity of views 
on key policy issues across Constituencies that we have encountered during this 
research. If there has been one consistent pattern to the views that our interviewees 
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have put forward, it is essentially that there is no real consensus on some fundamental 
policy issues. Within the GNSO Council there are very obvious divisions across 
different Constituencies on issues such as the purpose of WHOIS database, on issues 
surrounding the introduction of new gTLDs, and other important legacy issues such as 
the role of policy development in relation to existing contracts with registration 
industry stakeholders. One interviewee characterised the culture of the GNSO by 
suggesting that ‘the only thing that the GNSO can agree on is the time’. After pausing 
for reflection on this statement, he added ‘but then there is the time zone problem’.  
 
10.6 Any basic review of Constituency statements, minutes of meetings, and mailing 
lists reveal very fundamental and often intractable divisions on the substance of policy 
recommendations. On the recent discussions around the purpose of the WHOIS 
database, the Combined Task Force eventually put two alternative formulations 
forward to the Council on the purpose of WHOIS, simply as a result of the fact that 
the Task Force had been unable to break down intractable divisions between the 
Registries and Registrars on the one hand, and the combined interests of the BC, IP 
and ISP Constituencies on the other. The formulation supported by the registration 
industry and the Non-commercial Constituency envisaged a narrow conception of the 
purpose of WHOIS, driven largely by a cohabitation of interest between registration 
stakeholders interested in limiting the business costs that wider access rights would 
impose and privacy stakeholders interested in safeguarding the personal data of 
registrants from governments and private sector interests. The formulation supported 
by the business and IP interests envisaged a much wider purpose for WHOIS, 
underpinning their own interests in having access to data about registrants who may 
potentially infringe the rights of established intellectual property.  
 
10.7 The same potential for intractable positions in the Council can be seen in the 
current discussions around introduction of new gTLDs. In June 2005 the BC, IP and 
ISP Constituencies published a joint ‘White Paper’ setting out a position in support of 
introducing sponsored gTLDS on a first-come-first-serve basis with adequate 
‘sunrise’ provisions. Usually White Papers set out the policy of a government around 
which debate can take place in the legislature. We were unsure to what extent this 
document could be called a ‘White Paper’ in this strict sense. An alternative view on 
introducing new domains might be one represented by one or two of the large 
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registrars. This would see a much freer and liberal approach to introduction of new 
gTLDS both sponsored and un-sponsored, with varying approaches on how to allocate 
names. As the BC and IP position sketched above seems to favour a more constrained 
approach and limits on the amount of new domain space that could potentially give 
rise to abusive behaviour of IP interests, it is just as reasonable to assume that the 
Registrar position is a reflection of an interest in anything which increases the 
possible number of names on the market. Another example of potential intractable and 
ongoing counter positions might include the new PDP on amendments to existing 
conditions set out in registry contracts with ICANN.  
 
10.8 There are various clear advantages to having all these stakeholders in the same 
forum. All views are made known, and even if they are at times largely predictable 
positions held until the eleventh hour, there are benefits to having views clearly 
articulated. One or two people at most suggested to us that registration interests and 
user interests should be completely separated from each other. The problem lies in 
how to interpret and control for these predictable differences, and somehow fashion 
consensus (or something resembling consensus) from there. As one Board member 
suggested, ‘it leaves me with uncertainty about how to achieve bottom-up consensus 
policies when the parties who help to formulate these policies have fundamental 
conflicts’. This chimes with many other views that we heard from interviews, 
basically pointing out that most Constituencies have too much at stake both in terms 
of day-to-day business and in terms of personal livelihood and status to concede on 
issues where they would be better off either perpetuating a position of status quo, or 
simply dogmatically sticking to an intractable stance.  
 
10.9 This syndrome, if that is what it is, presents problems for the Board in terms of 
its ability to interpret Council recommendations and make a judgement on whether to 
adopt them. On policy development such as the new registry services PDP, which was 
largely setting up procedural provisions for reviewing any changes implemented by 
gTLD Registries, issues may be relatively uncontroversial and therefore relatively 
easy for the Board to agree. Any policy issues, which are anything more than 
uncontroversial or completely watered down will inevitably bear the predictable signs 
of partisanship. As another Board member told us: 
© LSE Public Policy Group Strictly confidential draft 98 
The Board will receive diverse interests that it will now have 
to resolve or reconcile…it is unlikely that the Board will get 
from its various policy initiatives a coherent view that does 
not contain input doesn’t contain some of the inescapable 
conflicts that these groups exhibit. 
 
Figure 47: Graph showing different levels of majority and the impact on 
consensus between Constituencies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10.10 Figure 47 above represents this general problem in very basic graphical terms. 
We can represent the relationship between domain name holders in general 
(encompassing all registrants globally who hold a generic domain names) and the 
views of stakeholders who have an interest in gTLD policy by a normal distribution 
curve. General welfare of domain name holders is represented on the y-axis. Varying 
extremes of views on particular issues relevant to gTLDs are represented on the x-
axis.  For example, narrow conceptions of the purpose of WHOIS would tend towards 
the left hand side of the x-axis whereas wider conceptions would tend towards the 
right. The same kind of thing can be applied to other issues, such as introduction of 
new gTLDs.  The challenge is therefore to engineer consensus so that both extremes 
are forced inwards towards the centre. The blue box illustrates an example of how 
different blocs may settle on a final position which incorporates too much of the two 
extremes, and in substantive policy terms, leaves too much unresolved. The recent 
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WHOIS decision on formulation 1 and 2 is an example of this, where effectively you 
have an agreement to disagree in order that the process can continue in some form or 
another. Consensus is too widely based, too loose, or at worst, non-existent.  
 
10.11 By forcing the area of consensus inwards towards the centre, the terrain for 
actual substantive agreement narrows (illustrated by the red box), and in doing so the 
overall welfare to domain name holders increases (moves from Point A to Point B). In 
the area designated by the red box, consensus is by definition deeper and much more 
focused around agreement on practicable measures and less on broad conceptual 
debates. There is also a much greater likelihood that stakeholders inside the area will 
be obliged to stick to commitments in later rounds of policy development. Such is the 
level of cynicism across ICANN about the relationship between what people say and 
where interests lie, that many of our interviewees expressed anything from surprise to 
disdain at the idea that consensus is possible given the current set up. One or two 
people suggested that we had a ‘strange idea of consensus’ in the sense that there are 
simply too many business, reputation, and personal livelihood interests at stake in this 
narrow community for consensus to be a relevant and realistic option. As previous 
quotes from Board members and other stakeholders have suggested, the ‘system 
might just be too broke to fix’, ‘people don’t want consensus’, and ‘getting 
[organizations] to agree to change is hard because these are the ones directly profiting 
from continuation of the status quo’.  
 
10.12 For all the focus on voting and the importance of ‘super-majority’ outcomes, 
there are some very systemic characteristics in the system, which tend to perpetuate 
intractable positions. The current voting system is designed so that the BC, IP, ISP 
and NCU Constituency members may cast one vote each, in other words each of these 
Constituencies has 3 votes and in total cast 12 votes. Registry and Registrar 
Constituency representatives however are entitled to cast 2 votes each, in effect giving 
them weighted double votes and the same number of votes in total as the other 4 
Constituencies. This recognises that these registration Constituencies are ‘under 
contract with ICANN obligating them to implement ICANN-adopted policies’, and 
therefore they should hold a relatively greater influence over policies, which have 
practical implementations for their business. There is scope for certain Council votes 
to be held under conditions where all Constituency representatives (including 
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Registries and Registrars) have one vote each. Nominating Committee representatives 
to the Council may cast one vote each. This makes a total of 27 votes.  
 
10.13 Figure 48 below shows some possible scenarios for how votes might line up, 
and how the current system perpetuates intractable positions. In this graph the y-axis 
represents the strength of consensus and the x-axis shows how different Constituency 
votes may stack from left to right. Scenario 1 represents broadly the outcome of the 
recent vote on the purpose of WHOIS. Here Registrars, Registries, Nominating 
Committee, and NCU Constituencies amassed 18 votes, achieving a 67 per cent 
super-majority. This was achieved without breaking the opposing bloc represented by 
BC, IP, and ISP Constituencies. By raising the required threshold to over 72 per cent 
however, a central requirement for a system known generally as Qualified Majority 
Voting (QMV), it would be absolutely necessary for the winning majority in this case 
to break into the opposing bloc and secure at least 2 votes from either the BC, the IP 
or the ISP Constituencies (of course it does not have to be the BC as this Figure 
suggests – this is drawn in this way for illustrative purposes only). By stipulating this 
requirement that potential must be broken from the outset, experience has shown that 
stakeholders are obliged to think in terms of how to develop policy that will in some 
way attract the more moderate ends of the opposing factions.  
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Figure 48: Some possible scenarios for voting outcomes in the Council 
 
 
 
NOTE: We recognize that Registries and Registrars may not always vote similarly. Just as BC, IP and 
ISP will not always vote together. We have portrayed them together in this diagram for illustration 
purposes. 
 
10.14 Looking at Scenario 2 we see that the current system makes it impossible for 
the BC, IP, and ISP to gain a super-majority of 67 per cent without in some way 
gaining the support of the Registrar and Registry Constituencies. On issues such as 
WHOIS, this presents an obvious incentive for the BC, IP and ISP to block progress 
in other ways related to the policy development process. Even if these Constituencies 
would deny that this was the case, the system is set up in such a way that they would 
be misguided not to at least think about it. Even with the Nominating Committee and 
the NCU onside, these Constituencies can only achieve 56 per cent of the vote.  
 
10.15 Having a systemic incentive from the outset for Constituencies to develop 
policy positions, which are in some way acceptable to opposing blocs, can help to 
mitigate the kinds of intractable differences that were discussed above. It might be for 
example, that certain smaller Registries within the Constituency may find more in 
common with diffuse business interests than with larger Registries within their 
Constituency. Alternatively middle-sized registrars may find a similar thing, and so in 
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developing policy positions Constituencies are more inclined to think about how their 
positions can be tailored to attract others. Scenario 3 above represents one possible 
example of a more disaggregated voting outcome, where Constituencies might be split 
and intractable blocs loosened. It is perhaps misleading to suggest that Registries and 
Registrars will always vote together on all issues. With issues on the table such as 
amendments to existing registry contracts, it is highly possible that Registries and 
Registrars will line up on opposing sides.  
 
10.16 Many of our interviewees have raised the issue of voting in the Council. Some 
have suggested that there is too much voting, and one is inclined to agree on the 
strength of the data presented above and the somewhat spurious lack of disagreement. 
But there is clearly a problem that the moment issues become important enough to 
selective interests, the emphasis on voting is as much part of the problem as it is part 
of the solution. As one Board member suggested, ‘it is all about voting. The whole 
emphasis on voting has really got out of hand […] In effect it is a kind of legislature 
where voting is terribly important’. Other people have suggested the weighted voting 
arrangements are a kind of necessary stabilizer to ensure that supplier interests can 
never be undermined without supplier consent in some form. This links to a further 
interesting diagnosis that the weighted voting arrangement is a symptom of a system 
that is broken. ‘Weighted voting should not be necessary…you shouldn’t have that 
problem in the first place’.  
 
10.17 Research has shown that voting systems using QMV frequently normalise very 
high levels of consensus across members, and can have the effect that voting becomes 
a mechanism for rubber stamping policy work that has already been designed from the 
outset in such a way that there will have to be a high level of buy-in at the end.  The 
work therefore is done at the executive policy development stage rather than, as recent 
examples have shown, in a rushed and unsatisfactory way at the eleventh hour by 
Council members ‘just wanting to find some kind of resolution to an issue that has 
been dragging on…however temporary that resolution may be’.  
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11. Future challenges for the GNSO 
 
11.1 We asked our survey respondents to think about the most important future 
challenges for the GNSO in the next 2 or 3 years. As with all our questions we asked 
them score a range of possible challenges on a scale of 1 to 7, and then assesses which 
were the most important and least important. Figure 49 below shows the number of 
times each challenge ranked highest or joint highest, and the number of times that 
each one rank lowest or joint lowest. The results confirm many of the major issues 
that have been raised in this document. Issues such as improving the overall quality of 
policy making, better transparency and openness, and broadening the range of 
participation in policy development were all near the top.  
 
Figure 49: How respondents to our survey viewed some future challenges for the 
GNSO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: 1. Another challenge: avoiding capture of the policy development process by a few activists 
who do not adequately represent the communities they claim to represent. 2. Being proactive and not 
reactive. 3. Being viewed by ICANN staff for guidance. 4. GETTING ICANN TO ACTUALLY 
imbibe the bottom up consensus approach and acknowledge feedback of the GNSO 5. The GNSO 
should not attempt to develop all policy, but on the contrary look for ways to delegate policy 
development 6. Letting Registrars know they exist! 7. Redefining the constituency structure and 
professionalizing the policy development process. Either GNSO has to become significantly more 
powerful - more like a legislature/regulator (which would require major reform of its structure) - or 
significantly less powerful and the decision making authority pushed elsewhere, to national govts, 
and/or the staff and Board. Many of the more general policy development and outreach processes might 
be better handled via the new UN Internet Governance Forum. GNSO needs to think about how it will 
intersect with that. 
 
 
-103424Raising the profile of the GNSO as a policy development body
-32522Encouraging more intensive participation by major 
organisations in gTLD policy development
527Some other challenge
52328Broadening the range of organisations participating in gTLD policy development
122436Representing more effectively the views of Internet 
users worldwide
182240Improving transparency and openness in gTLD policy development
181735Improving the quality of gTLD policy making
Net rankRanked 
lowest
Ranked 
highest
© LSE Public Policy Group Strictly confidential draft 104 
 
Bibliography 
 
ICANN Documents: 
 
A Mission Statement for the IETF. Network Working Group. (October 2004).  
 
Budget – Fiscal Year 2001-2002 (Adopted 4 June 2001). 6650 
 
Budget – Fiscal Year 2002-2003 (Adopted 28 June 2002). 10314 
 
Budget – Fiscal Year 2003-2004 (Adopted 26 June 2003). 9563 
 
Budget – Fiscal Year 2004-2005 (Adopted 22 September 2004, Updated 6 October 
2004). 9955 
 
Budget – Fiscal Year 2005-2006 (Adopted 15 July 2005). 9324 
 
Combined WHOIS Task Force (1, 2, 3) of the GNSO Council. Final task force report 
on Recommendations for improving notification and consent for the use of contact 
data in the Whois system. (April 2005). 5265 
 
Combined WHOIS Task Force (1, 2, 3) of the GNSO Council. Preliminary task force 
report on a policy recommendation and advice on a procedure for handling conflicts 
between a registrar/registry's legal obligations under privacy laws and their 
contractual obligations to ICANN. (September 2005). 8518 
 
Comments of Intellectual Property Constituency on New TLDs. (24 August 2000). 
1376 
 
Designating a successor operator for the .net registry. Final GNSO report. (July 2004 
revised).  
 
Draft Approach for addressing new gTLD policy needs. (2 September 2005). 1332 
 
Draft Revised .COM Registry Agreement. (29 January 2006).  
 
Final Report and Recommendations of the GNSO Council's Transfers Task Force 
Policies and Processes for Gaining and Losing Registrars. (12 February 2003). 17579 
 
Final Report of the GNSO Council's WHOIS Task Force on Accuracy and Bulk 
Access. (6 February 2003, Amended on 19 February 2003). 9309 
 
GNSO Council Deletes Task Force Report. (17 June 2003). 5948 
 
GNSO Initial Report: Introduction of New Generic Top-Level Domains. (Draft 
Version 1.4, 14 February 2006). 8005 
 
GNSO Issues Report Proposed .COM Registry Agreement. (2 January 2006).  
 
© LSE Public Policy Group Strictly confidential draft 105 
GNSO Issues Report: Introduction of New TopLevel Domains. (Draft Version 1.3, 5 
December 2005).  
 
Guidelines for the Implementation of Internationalized Domain Names. Version 2.0. 
(8 November 2005). 1628 
 
ICANN Byelaws: Article X: Generic Names Supporting Organization. (28 February 
2006).  
 
ICANN Generic Names Supporting Organization Council Task Force 3. Improve the 
Accuracy of Data Collected from gTLD Registrants. Preliminary Report. (28 May 
2004).  
 
ICANN Stockholm Meeting Topic: Status Report of the Internationalized Domain 
Names Internal Working Group of the ICANN Board of Directors. (1 June 2001). 
5074 
 
Initial Report: GNSO Wellington Meeting Input. (March 2006). 9000 
 
Internationalized Domain Names (IDN) Committee. Briefing Paper on IDN 
Permissible Code Point Problems. (27 February 2002). 2042 
 
IPC Constituency Statement. Whois Task Force 1. (24 March 2004).  
 
Policy on Transfer of Registrations between Registrars. (12 July 2004). 2806 
 
Preliminary task force report on the purpose of Whois and of the Whois contacts. (23 
December 2005).  
 
Preliminary task force report on the purpose of Whois and of the Whois contacts. (18 
January 2006). 13449 
 
Procedure for use by ICANN in considering requests for consent and related 
contractual amendments to allow changes in the architecture or operation of a gTLD 
registry. Final Report. (30 June 2005). 19702 
 
Registrar Constituency (RC) Position Paper Regarding the proposed Wait List Service 
(WLS). (26 February 2002).  
 
Registrar Transfer Dispute Resolution Policy. (12 July 2004). 4461 
 
Report of the Internationalized Domain Names Internal Working Group of the 
ICANN Board of Directors. (28 August 2001). 9014 
 
Staff Manager's Issue Report on the Need for a Predictable Procedure for Changes in 
the Operation of TLD Registries. (19 November 2003, Updated 2 December 2003). 
3529 
 
Staff Manager's Issues Report on Privacy Issues Related to Whois. (13 May 2003). 
3221 
© LSE Public Policy Group Strictly confidential draft 106 
 
Staff Manager's Issues Report on UDRP Review. (1 August 2003). 3291 
 
Staff Report to GNSO Council: Experiences with Inter-Registrar Transfer Policy. (14 
April 2005).  
 
Status Report on the sTLD Evaluation Process. (December 2005). 
 
Strategy: Introduction of New Generic Top-Level Domains. (30 September 2004).  
 
Summary of Comments on the Proposed VeriSign Settlement. (11 December 2005).  
 
Summary of Draft Revisions to VeriSign Settlement Agreement/.COM Registry 
Agreement. (29 January 2006).  
 
Terms of Reference for a PDP to guide Contractual Conditions for existing generic 
top-level domains. (February 2006).  
 
The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3. Network Working Group. (October 
1996). 
 
The Tao of IETF: A Novice's Guide to the Internet Engineering Task Force. (August 
2001). 13805 
 
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy. (Policy Adopted: 26 August 1999.  
Implementation Documents Approved: 24October 1999). 2290 
 
Whois Task Force 1. Restricting Access of Whois For Marketing Purposes. 
Preliminary Report. (22 October 2003). 
 
Whois Task Force 2. Preliminary Report. (No date given).  
 
 
ICANN Press Releases: 
 
Advisory Inter-Registrar Transfers: Implementation Requirements. ICANN 
announces implementation of new policy rules for transfer of domain names between 
registrars. Posted: 12 July 2004. 
 
Expired Domain Deletion Policy. Posted: 21 September 2004. 
 
ICANN Domain Name Transfer Policy Becomes Effective. Posted: 12 November 
2004. 
 
New TLD Questions. Posted: 7 June 2005. 
 
Restored Names Accuracy Policy. Posted: 12 August 2004. 
 
 
 
© LSE Public Policy Group Strictly confidential draft 107 
Other: 
 
Aizu, Isumi, Peake, Adam, Berman, Jerry, Davidson, Alan, Courtney, Rob, Ahlert, 
Christian, Harshberger, Scott, Simon, Don, Draheim, Andy, Johnson, Scott Albert, 
Levin, Alan, Neville, Mark, Echeberría, Raúl, Alfonso, Carlos, Dzidonu, Clement, 
Verhulst, Stefaan, Myungkoo Kang, Hofmann, Jeanette (2001) ICANN, Legitimacy, 
and the Public Voice: Making Global Participation and Representation Work. Report 
of the NGO and Academic ICANN Study. NGO and Academic ICANN Study.  
 
Al-Zoman, Abdulaziz H. Arabic Top Level Domains. www.arabicdomains.org. 
[Accessed 30 May 2006]. 
 
Auerbach, Karl (2003) Will Network Solutions/Verisign Get Away With It Again? 
Posted: 22 September 2003.  
 
Bettinger, Torsten (1997) Trademark Law in Cyberspace: The Battle of the Domain 
Names. International Review of Industrial Property and Copyright Law, 28, 4: 508-
620. 
 
Cerf, Vinton G. (2004) Internet Governance. (Draft, 28 October 2004).  
 
Committee on Internet Navigation and the Domain Name System: Technical 
Alternatives and Policy Implications (2005) Signposts in Cyberspace: The Domain 
Name System and Internet Navigation. Washington DC: National Research Council.  
 
Dierkes, Meinolf, Jeanette Hofmann and Lutz Marz (1998) ‘Technological 
Development and Organizational Change: Differing Patterns of Innovation’ in 21st 
Century Technologies: Balancing Economic, Social and Environmental Goals. Paris: 
OECD.  
 
Frieden, Rob (2002) Revenge of the Bellheads: how the Netheads lost control of the 
Internet. Telecommunications Policy, 26: 425-444. 
 
Froomkin, A.M and Lemley, M. (2003) ICANN and antitrust. University of Illinois 
Law Review, 1: 1-76. 
 
Froomkin, A.M. (2000) Wrong turn in cyberspace: Using ICANN to route around the 
APA and the constitution. Duke Law Journal, 50, 1: 17-184. 
 
GAO (2005) Internet Management: Prevalence of False Contact Information for 
Registered Domain Names. Report to the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and 
Intellectual Property, House of Representatives. November. Washington DC: GAO.  
 
Halpin, E.  and Simpson, S.  (2002) Between self-regulation and intervention in the 
networked economy: the European Union and Internet policy. Journal of Information 
Science, 28, 4: 285-296. 
 
Informatique & Communication (2005) Unicode/IDN in Africa. Echos, No. 21, 
September.  
 
© LSE Public Policy Group Strictly confidential draft 108 
Klein, Hans (2002) ICANN and Internet Governance: Leveraging Technical 
Coordination to Realize Global Public Policy. The Information Society, 18:193–207. 
 
Kleinwaechter, Wolfgang (2000) ICANN between technical mandate and political 
challenges. Telecommunications Policy, 24: 553-563.  
 
Koppell, Jonathan G.S. (2005) Pathologies of Accountability: ICANN and the 
Challenge of “Multiple Accountabilities Disorder”. Public Administration Review, 
January/February, 65, 1: 94-108. 
 
Litan, Robert E. (2001) Law and Policy in the Age of the Internet. Duke Law Journal, 
50: 1045-1085. 
 
Mueller, Milton (2001) Rough Justice: A Statistical Assessment of ICANN’s Uniform 
Dispute Resolution Policy. The Information Society, 17:151–163.  
 
Mueller, Milton L. and McKnight, Lee W. (2004) The post-.COM internet: toward 
regular and objective procedures for internet governance. Telecommunications Policy, 
28: 487–502. 
 
OECD (2004) Generic Top Level Domain Names: Market Development And 
Allocation Issues. Paris: OECD Working Party on Telecommunication and 
Information Services Policies.  
 
Office of the ICANN Ombudsman (2005) Creating Dialogue, Affirming Fairness. 
Annual Report.  
 
Osborn, J.  (2000) Effective and complementary solutions to domain name disputes: 
ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy and the federal 
anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999. Notre Dame Law Review, 76, 1: 
209-240. 
 
Palfrey, John, Chen, Clifford, Hwang, Sam and Eisenkraft, Noah (no year given) 
Public Participation in ICANN: A Preliminary Study. Berkman Center for Internet & 
Society, Harvard Law School. Available on 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/publicparticipation/. [Accessed 05/06/06.] 
 
Sharry, Patrick (2005) Review of comments on the ICANN strategic plan. (March 
2005).  
 
Weinberg, Jonathan (2001) ICANN and The Problem of Legitimacy. Duke Law 
Journal, 50: 187-260.  
 
Williams, Elizabeth A. (2003) The Globalisation of Regulation and its Impact on the 
Domain Name System: Domain Names and a New Regulatory Economy. PhD Thesis, 
University of Queensland. 
© LSE Public Policy Group Strictly confidential draft 109 
Appendix 1: Our Methods 
 
A1. At the end of February 2006 we set up a basic research website (www.icann-
gnsoreview.org) through which we aimed to collect as wide a range of views as 
possible about the GNSO and gTLD policy development work in ICANN. The 
website homepage translated into 8 world languages (English, Chinese, Arabic, 
French, German, Russian, Spanish, and Portuguese), and we posted some basic 
material explaining the objectives of the research and a brief glossary to translate 
ICANN and DNS jargon for the uninitiated. The domain name was designed to 
include references to both ICANN and GNSO in order to increase the chances of 
recognition with business and non-commercial stakeholders who would be more 
familiar with ICANN and less so, if at all, with the GNSO. The website offered four 
main channels for people to register their views on the GNSO as follows: 
 
Survey questionnaire for Constituency members We designed a relatively short 
online questionnaire to be completed by liaisons or representatives from 
member organizations of the six GNSO Constituencies. In order to increase 
potential for comparison across Constituencies, these surveys were generic in 
structure and content. They were designed so that respondents had the option 
of working through them quickly (in 15 minutes or so) simply inputting scores 
on basic Likert scales (from 1 to 7) for different aspects of Constituency and 
GNSO performance. There were also free text boxes for respondents to write 
in comments or views at the end of each question. This aimed to generate a 
combination of quantitative data showing relative views across clusters of 
questions, and more qualitative comments on the GNSO, strengths and 
weaknesses, and so on.  
 
Survey questionnaire for individuals This survey was designed to capture the 
views of individuals active within ICANN (or on the periphery) on the GNSO 
and its policy development work. There is a narrow but highly intensive 
community of debate around ICANN, particularly on individual ‘blog’ sites 
and discussion forums. We wanted to capture the views of these ICANN 
participants or knowledgeable observers. We also invited ICANN staff 
members to complete a survey from their own individual perspective.  
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Survey questionnaire for non-member organizations An important aspect of 
this research was to try to find out why organizations from business and the 
civil society do not participate in the GNSO Constituency structure. This 
survey was designed to collect views of non-member organizations on the 
GNSO (and failing that, ICANN).  
 
Email posting facility In order to canvas views globally we set up an email 
facility capable of receiving comments in any world language. This provided a 
free and open channel for views on the GNSO and ICANN. The surveys above 
were only available in English, as we were simply limited by resources and 
time constraints.  
 
A2. We were keen ensure the integrity of survey responses, in the sense that an 
organization or individual could only submit one survey and that data inputted would 
be secure and only accessible by them. In order to implement this, we opted to assign 
usernames and passwords to all survey respondents. Our research team sent this 
information to all Constituency members with an invitation to complete the survey. 
For individuals and non-members, we asked respondents to send us a short email 
requesting username and password. The risk of such an approach is that potential 
respondents will be put off from completing a survey by the effort involved in 
requesting log in details. Our view is that the integrity and security of the survey 
responses was a high priority, and that by asking respondents to do this little bit of 
administration, we would increase the chances that responses we did receive were 
serious and authentic.  
 
A3. It is almost always insufficient to assume that simply by setting up a research 
website and putting some surveys on it, people will be inherently interested and will 
respond. During March 2006 we employed a group of 10 LSE post-graduate students 
to carry out work to encourage Constituency members to visit the website, solicit 
comments in languages other than English, and generally get as many and as diverse a 
range of organizations as possible to contribute a view. Our students were allocated a 
Constituency each and asked to establish contact with all registered member 
organizations, identify the key person, and encourage them to complete a survey. 
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Constituencies list members on their websites to varying degrees of detail and 
accuracy, and so this work combined working from contact information provided on 
Constituency websites, lists provided by Constituency secretariats, and 
straightforward cold calling or emailing. 
 
A4. Our students were also allocated world regions according to their particular 
language skills, and asked to identify named contacts in major organizations that 
might have some interest in the global Domain Name System, ICANN, and by chance 
the GNSO. We intentionally left the scope for comments relatively wide to encourage 
as many views as possible. The languages covered included all those translated on the 
website homepage as well as others such as Hindi and Turkish. Invitations were sent 
to named contacts to visit the website and post a comment.  
  
A5. A separate strand of the research has been to conduct in-depth and semi-
structured interviews with around 80 stakeholders either inside the ICANN process or 
at varying degrees of distance from it. These interviews have been conducted either 
by telephone conference, or face-to-face in Brussels and in Wellington, NZ during the 
March 2006 meeting. We hope to conduct further feedback discussion at the meeting 
in Marrakech in June 2006. Discussions have generally lasted between 45 minutes and 
90 minutes, with practically all of the interviews recorded. We have tried to be very 
clear about our commitment to confidentiality prior to each interview, and in all cases 
have asked permission from the interviewee to use a tape recorder. We have explained 
that comments will not be attributed to individuals or organizations in these final 
reports. We have spoken in detail to GNSO Council members, former Council 
members, Constituency officials, Constituency member representatives, ICANN staff, 
current Board members, former Board members, staff from other ICANN supporting 
organizations, participating individuals, government representatives, academics, non-
member organizations, and a range of knowledgeable ‘old timers’ (remembering that 
ICANN is only 7 years old) and observers.  
  
A6. There is a vast range of opportunity for unobtrusive analysis of the GNSO from 
data freely and publicly available on the ICANN and the GNSO website. As one 
interviewee put it, ‘if you have the time and the patience you can find practically 
everything on the ICANN website…in a way, ICANN is freakishly transparent’. 
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Resources such as mailing lists, minutes of meetings, constituency statements, 
transcripts of meeting discussions, and data on domain name registrations, provide 
rich potential for constructing objective data-based checks and cross-references 
against more subjective comments. We have attempted to be as thorough as possible 
in using this kind of objective data source to triangulate positions with our findings 
from interviews and surveys. It will, of course, be the case that unobtrusive analysis of 
specific types of data will only reveal a certain amount of the full picture. For 
example, counting the number of postings to mailing lists can often give quite a 
reliable and detailed picture of the dynamics of participation across Constituencies. 
Nevertheless, it is important to realise the limitations of this kind of analysis, for 
example many important discussions might take place through other channels.  In 
general, however, we have found that applying basic quantitative techniques to 
resources such as ‘tallying’ mailing lists and meeting minutes can give surprisingly 
intuitive outputs that can be used to support or debunk arguments that we have heard 
along the way.  
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Glossary 
 
A 
 
Advisory Committee  
An Advisory Committee is a formal advisory body made up of representatives from 
the Internet community to advise ICANN on a particular issue or policy area. Several 
are mandated by the ICANN Bylaws and others may be created as needed. Advisory 
committees have no legal authority to act for ICANN, but report their findings and 
make recommendations to the ICANN Board. 
ALAC At Large Advisory Committee 
ICANN's At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC) is responsible for considering and 
providing advice on the activities of the ICANN, as they relate to the interests of 
individual Internet users (the "At-Large" community). ICANN, as a private sector, 
non-profit corporation with technical management responsibilities for the Internet's 
domain name and address system, will rely on the ALAC and its supporting 
infrastructure to involve and represent in ICANN a broad set of individual user 
interests.  
ASO Address Supporting Organisation  
The Address Supporting Organisation (ASO) advises the ICANN Board of Directors 
on policy issues relating to the allocation and management of Internet Protocol (IP) 
addresses. The ASO selects two Directors for the ICANN Board. 
 
C 
ccNSO Country Code Names Supporting Organisation  
The purpose of the ccNSO is to engage and provide leadership in activities relevant to 
country-code top-level domains (ccTLDs). This is achieved by: 1) Developing policy 
recommendations to the ICANN Board; 2) Nurturing consensus across the ccNSO's 
community, including the name-related activities of ccTLDs; and 3) Coordinating 
with other ICANN SO's, Committees, or constituencies under ICANN. The ccNSO 
selects one person to serve on the Board. 
ccTLD Country Code Top Level Domain  
Two letter domains, such as .uk (United Kingdom), .de (Germany) and .jp (Japan) (for 
example), are called country code top level domains (ccTLDs) and correspond to a 
country, territory, or other geographic location. The rules and policies for registering 
domain names in the ccTLDs vary significantly and ccTLD registries limit use of the 
ccTLD to citizens of the corresponding country. Some ICANN-accredited registrars 
provide registration services in the ccTLDs in addition to registering names in .biz, 
.com, .info, .name, .net and .org, however, ICANN does not specifically accredit 
registrars to provide ccTLD registration services. 
 
D 
DNS Domain Name System 
The Domain Name System (DNS) helps users to find their way around the Internet. 
Every computer on the Internet has a unique address - just like a telephone number - 
which is a rather complicated string of numbers. It is called its "IP address" (IP stands 
for "Internet Protocol"). IP Addresses are hard to remember. The DNS makes using 
the Internet easier by allowing a familiar string of letters (the "domain name") to be 
used instead of the arcane IP address. So instead of typing 207.151.159.3, you can 
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type www.internic.net. It is a "mnemonic" device that makes addresses easier to 
remember. 
DNSO Domain Name Supporting Organisation 
The DNSO was the original policy SO set up within ICANN in 1999. In December 
2002 the responsibilities of the DNSO were passed on the GNSO. 
 
G 
GAC Government Advisory Committee 
The GAC is an advisory committee comprising appointed representatives of national 
governments, multi-national governmental organisations and treaty organisations, and 
distinct economies. Its function is to advise the ICANN Board on matters of concern 
to governments. The GAC will operate as a forum for the discussion of government 
interests and concerns, including consumer interests. As an advisory committee, the 
GAC has no legal authority to act for ICANN, but will report its findings and 
recommendations to the ICANN Board. 
 
 
gTLD Generic Top Level Domain 
Most TLDs with three or more characters are referred to as ‘generic’ TLDs, or 
‘gTLDs’. They can be subdivided into two types, "sponsored" TLDs (sTLDs) and 
"unsponsored TLDs (uTLDs), as described in more detail below. In the 1980s, seven 
gTLDs (.com, .edu, .gov, .int, .mil, .net, and .org) were created. Domain names may 
be registered in three of these (.com, .net, and .org) without restriction; the other four 
have limited purposes.  
 
Over the next twelve years, various discussions occurred concerning additional 
gTLDs, leading to the selection in November 2000 of seven new TLDs for 
introduction. These were introduced in 2001 and 2002. Four of the new TLDs (.biz, 
.info, .name, and .pro) are unsponsored. The other three new TLDs (.aero, .coop, and 
.museum) are sponsored.  
 
Generally speaking, an unsponsored TLD operates under policies established by the 
global Internet community directly through the ICANN process, while a sponsored 
TLD is a specialized TLD that has a sponsor representing the narrower community 
that is most affected by the TLD. The sponsor thus carries out delegated policy-
formulation responsibilities over many matters concerning the TLD. 
GNSO Generic Names Supporting Organisation 
The GNSO is the successor to the responsibilities of the Domain Name Supporting 
Organization (DNSO) that relate to the generic top-level domains. The GNSO is the 
body of six constituencies, as follows: the Business and Commercial User 
constituency, the gTLD Registry constituency, the ISP constituency, the Non-
commercial User constituency, the Registrar constituency, and the IP constituency. 
 
I 
IANA Internet Assigned Numbers Authority  
The IANA is the authority originally responsible for the oversight of IP address 
allocation, the coordination of the assignment of protocol parameters provided for in 
Internet technical standards, and the management of the DNS, including the 
delegation of top-level domains and oversight of the root name server system. Under 
ICANN, the IANA continues to distribute addresses to the Regional Internet 
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Registries, coordinate with the IETF and others to assign protocol parameters, and 
oversee the operation of the DNS. 
ICANN The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers  
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is an 
internationally organized, non-profit corporation that has responsibility for Internet 
Protocol (IP) address space allocation, protocol identifier assignment, generic (gTLD) 
and country code (ccTLD) Top-Level Domain name system management, and root 
server system management functions. Originally, the Internet Assigned Numbers 
Authority (IANA) and other entities performed these services under US Government 
contract. ICANN now performs the IANA function. As a private-public partnership, 
ICANN is dedicated to preserving the operational stability of the Internet; to 
promoting competition; to achieving broad representation of global Internet 
communities; and to developing policy appropriate to its mission through bottom-up, 
consensus-based processes. 
IDN Internationalized Domain Names  
Internationalized Domain Names, or IDNs, are web addresses in your own language. 
Many efforts are underway in the Internet community to make domain names 
available in character sets other than ASCII. These ‘internationalized domain name’ 
(IDN) efforts were the subject of a 25 September 2000 resolution by the ICANN 
Board of Directors, in which it recognized ‘that it is important that the Internet evolve 
to be more accessible to those who do not use the ASCII character set’, but stressed 
that ‘the internationalization of the Internet's domain name system must be 
accomplished through standards that are open, non-proprietary, and fully compatible 
with the Internet's existing end-to-end model and that preserve globally unique 
naming in a universally resolvable public name space’. 
IGF Internet Governance Forum 
The IGF was set up by the United Nations in 2005 to be a forum for multi-stakeholder 
policy dialogue. 
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force  
The IETF is a large open international community of network designers, operators, 
vendors, and researchers concerned with the evolution of the Internet architecture and 
the smooth operation of the Internet. It is open to any interested individual. 
IP Internet Protocol  
The communications protocol underlying the Internet (IP), allows large, 
geographically diverse networks of computers to communicate with each other 
quickly and economically over a variety of physical links. An Internet Protocol 
Address is the numerical address by which a location in the Internet is identified. 
Computers on the Internet use IP addresses to route traffic and establish connections 
among themselves; people generally use the human-friendly names made possible by 
the Domain Name System (see above). 
ISOC The Internet Society  
The Internet Society is the international organisation for global cooperation and 
coordination for the Internet and its internetworking technologies and applications. 
ISOC membership is open to any interested person. 
ISP Internet Service Provider 
An ISP is a company, which provides access to the Internet to organisations and/or 
individuals. Access services provided by ISPs may include web hosting, email, VoIP 
(voice over IP), and support for many other applications. 
 
R 
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Registrar  
Domain names ending with .aero, .biz, .com, .coop, .info, .museum, .name, .net, .org, 
and .pro can be registered through many different companies (known as ‘registrars’) 
that compete with one another. The registrar you choose will ask you to provide 
various contact and technical information that makes up the registration. The 
Registrar will then keep records of the contact information and submit the technical 
information to a central directory known as the ‘registry’. This registry provides other 
computers on the Internet the information necessary to send you email or to find your 
web site. You will also be required to enter a registration contract with the registrar, 
which sets forth the terms under which your registration is accepted and will be 
maintained. 
Registry  
The Registry is the authoritative, master database of all domain names registered in 
each Top Level Domain. The registry operator keeps the master database and also 
generates the ‘zone file’ which allows computers to route Internet traffic to and from 
top-level domains anywhere in the world. Internet users don't interact directly with the 
registry operator; users can register names in TLDs including .biz, .com, .info, .net, 
.name, .org by using an ICANN-Accredited Registrar. 
RIR Regional Internet Registry   
There are currently four RIRs: APNIC, ARIN, LACNIC and RIPE NCC. These non-
profit organisations are responsible for distributing IP addresses on a regional level to 
Internet service providers and local registries. 
Root Servers  
The root servers contain the IP addresses of all the TLD registries - both the global 
registries such as .com, .org, etc. and the 244 country-specific registries such as .fr 
(France), .cn (China), etc. This is critical information. If the information is not 100 per 
cent correct or if it is ambiguous, it might not be possible to locate a key registry on 
the Internet. In DNS parlance, the information must be unique and authentic. 
 
S 
Supporting Organisations (SO)  
The SOs are the three specialized advisory bodies that will advise the ICANN Board 
of Directors on issues relating to domain names (GNSO and ccNSO) and IP addresses 
(ASO). 
 
T 
TLD Top Level Domain  
TLDs are the names at the top of the DNS naming hierarchy. They appear in domain 
names as the string of letters following the last (rightmost) ‘.’, such as ‘net’ in 
‘www.example.net’. The administrator for a TLD controls what second-level names 
are recognized in that TLD. The administrators of the ‘root domain’ or ‘root zone’ 
control what TLDs are recognized by the DNS. Commonly used TLDs include .com, 
.net, .edu, .jp, .de, etc. 
 
U 
UDRP Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy  
All ICANN-accredited registrars follow a uniform dispute resolution policy. Under 
that policy, disputes over entitlement to a domain-name registration are ordinarily 
resolved by court litigation between the parties claiming rights to the registration. 
Once the courts rule who is entitled to the registration, the registrar will implement 
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that ruling. In disputes arising from registrations allegedly made abusively (such as 
"cybersquatting" and cyberpiracy"), the uniform policy provides an expedited 
administrative procedure to allow the dispute to be resolved without the cost and 
delays often encountered in court litigation. 
 
W 
WGIG Working Group on Internet Governance 
This is a UN Working Group that was set up following the first phase of WSIS in 
Geneva in 2003. It was asked to address to address issues such as developing a 
working definition of Internet Governance and identifying the public policy issues 
that are relevant to it.  
WHOIS  
Information about who is responsible for domain names is publicly available to allow 
rapid resolution of technical problems and to permit enforcement of consumer 
protection, trademark, and other laws. The registrar will make this information 
available to the public on a ‘Whois’ site. It is however possible to register a domain in 
the name of a third party, as long as they agree to accept responsibility. 
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organisation  
WIPO is an intergovernmental organisation based in Geneva, Switzerland responsible 
for the promotion of the protection of intellectual rights throughout the world. It is one 
of the 16 specialized agencies of the United Nations system of organisations. 
WSIS World Summit on the Information Society 
The UN General Assembly in December 2001 endorsed the holding of the World 
Summit on the Information Society in two phases. The first phase of WSIS took place 
in Geneva in December 2003. It addressed the broad range of themes concerning the 
Information Society and adopted a Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action. The 
second phase took place in Tunis in November 2005. It requested the setting up of the 
IGF (see above).  
 
